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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, during periods of crisis or perceived threat of socie-
tal fragmentation, governments have often restricted or deprived their
citizens of basic civil liberties.' The United States has not been
immune from this practice.2 Repressive actions by political authori-
1. This phenomenon has been extensively explored and documented. See generally, F.
BIDDLE, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM (1951); K. BOYLE, ARTICLE 19: INFORMATION, FREEDOM,
AND CENSORSHIP 1-18 (1988); H. COMMAGER, FREEDOM AND ORDER: A COMMENTARY ON
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE (1966); M. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA:
THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION (1971); J. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF
PROTEST (1969). For an analysis of the phenomenon's significance in first amendment
jurisprudence, see Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 450 (1985).
2. Examples are numerous and date to the earliest European colonization of North
America. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 451 n.2. A brief summary includes: the 1637 ouster of
Ann Hutchinson from the Massachusetts Bay Colony, E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA:
THE STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP 153-54 (1958); the Salem witchcraft trials, J. DEMOS,
ENTERTAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFT AND THE CULTURE OF EARLY NEW ENGLAND
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ties have occurred in response to myriad situations: severe economic
distress, such as depressions or strike waves;3 wars, or foreign policy
crises that facilitate war;4 and the spread of political philosophies
which appear to threaten the dominant ideology.5 Efforts to focus the
qualms and distrust of a society on a suitable scapegoat have been
(1982); the Alien and Sedition Acts, J. H. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETrERS: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1966); the furor directed towards
Masonites in the early 1800's, A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL HISTORY TO 1860 354-58 (1944); the religious repression of Native American Indians,
V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 232-33 (1983); the
religious restrictions on Mormon practice during the mid-1800's, L. ARRINGTON & D.
BITrON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 44-64
(1979); the legal and social discrimination experienced by Catholic immigrants, A.
MENENDEZ, JOHN F. KENNEDY: CATHOLIC AND HUMANIST 5-30 (1987); the subjugation of
anarchists following the Haymarket Riot of 1886, J. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH
(1968). For an excellent discussion of more recent episodes of repression in United States
history, see R. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO
THE PRESENT (1978); see also J. SKOLNICK, supra note 1, at 8-24. It is important to remember
that, despite the numerous and chronic incidents of discrimination and political repression in
this country's history, there simultaneously exists an equal, if not stronger, tradition of
freedom, diversity, and respect for dissent. It is to this nobler American tradition that this
Comment appeals.
3. For example, commentators have directly linked the rise of Nazism in Germany
during the 1930's to the economic adversity of the times. See J. TOLAND, ADOLF HITLER 261-
62 (1976). Hitler's popular rhetoric blamed the Jews, Gypsies, Communists, homosexuals and
others who were not "Aryan-enough" for Germany's misfortunes and claimed that the
purging of these elements served a "higher ideal." R. WOETZEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FREEDOM 42 (1966).
In the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930's, incidents like the Bonus
Army episode and the Red Scare of 1935 demonstrate that depressive economic conditions,
when coupled with inflammatory rhetoric and a readily identifiable scapegoat, can produce
notable restrictions in civilian liberty. See generally, R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 195-300
(discussing governmental responses to strikes and worker unrest).
4. One of the most notorious examples of repression during a period of declared war is
the internment of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps, documented in cases such as
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Other examples of wartime repression in
United States history include the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) trials following
World War I and the attempted prosecution of so-called "native fascists" during World War
II. See E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947) (discussing sedition
prosecutions in World Wars I and II); see also Blasi, supra note 1, at 494 (arguing that wartime
radically increases likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be punished for their
nonconformity).
5. The compelled suicide of Socrates, the crucifixion of Jesus, the oppression directed
against Christians and then Gnostics in the early formation of the Catholic Church, the
burning at the stake of medieval witches and heretics, the involuntary recantation of Galileo,
the attempted persecution of the Jeffersonians, the treatment of Native Americans in the
United States, and the modern involvement with totalitarian fascism, socialism and
communism all demonstrate that many governments or religious authorities throughout
history have responded with vengeance to the expression of beliefs that they viewed as
threatening. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at x; see also POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES xiii-xiv (R. Dahl ed. 1966) (emphasizing the tendency of
governments to respond to internal opposition with violence).
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especially effective when directed towards outside threats or foreign
"isms." 6 Suspected Republicans during the late' 1700's, 7 immigrant
groups throughout the 1800's,8 unions during the late 1800's, 9 social-
ists during the early 1900's,' 0 Japanese-Americans during the
1940's," and Communists during the 1950's' are just a few examples
6. Blasi, supra note 1, at 495; see also W. EBENSTEIN, TODAY'S ISMS: COMMUNISM,
FASCISM, SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM 108 (4th ed. 1964) ("The answer of totalitarian
dictatorships is to direct this latent hostility of the people against real or imaginary enemies."
(emphasis in original)).
7. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. This is popularly referred to as the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798. The Alien and Sedition Act was used to persecute Jeffersonian
Republicans for their political views, instigating a constitutional crisis that the courts have not
forgotten. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78 (1964)
(controversy over Alien and Sedition Act helped establish the principle that debate on public
issues must be uninhibited and allowed to contain vehement attacks on government policies).
8. White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant Americans (WASPs), organized politically as "Native
Americans," sought to protect their political power, influence, and values through legislative
and popular restrictions on immigrant groups and activities. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 1, at
13. For example, prohibitions on the use of opium, a drug which was prevalent among
Japanese and Chinese immigrants, developed in part as a social control measure to curtail their
"alien" activities. See D. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE 78-82 (1982); J. HELMER, DRUGS
AND MINORITY OPPRESSION (1975). For a discussion of "nativist" riots, mob actions, and
lynchings against various immigrant groups, see J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND
(1955).
9. S. YELLEN, AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES (1969) (recounting major periods of
turmoil in the history of the U.S. labor movement and the responses of governmental
authorities). After the great railroad strike of 1877, for instance, many states passed anti-labor
conspiracy laws, and the courts revived the common law doctrine of malicious conspiracy. R.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32.
10. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 578-97 (1948). But cf.
Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920) (admonishing presumptive atmosphere of
guilt surrounding trials of socialists). Many states passed criminal syndicalism or sedition laws
and prosecuted with vengeance suspected socialists, anti-war activists, and others. Z. CHAFEE,
supra, at 56-65. The passions of war and the fear of sedition can produce odd judicial
responses. In one instance, an individual's statement that "[t]he second and third verses of the
'Star Spangled Banner' are nothing but rotten doggerel" was held to be a violation of the
Minnesota Espionage Act. State v. Freerks, 140 Minn. 349, 350 (1918).
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). During World War II, over 112,000
law-abiding Japanese-Americans were subjected to curfews and later uprooted and forced into
"relocation camps," pursuant to a series of Executive Orders issued in response to military
authorities' assessment that their presence on the West Coast posed a security risk in the war
against Japan. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Final Report,
Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, by Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt). The Supreme
Court held that it was permissible to detain these Japanese-American citizens in accordance
with the war powers of the Congress, the military authorities, and the President as
Commander-in-Chief. Id. at 217. The unspoken assumption in the Japanese relocation was
that the racial ties between the Japanese-Americans and Imperial Japan would lead to treason,
sabotage, and perfidy. Id. at 237-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Similiar reasoning was not
applied to other "enemy ethnics" like the German-Americans or Italian-Americans. Id.
12. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Marshall v. United States, 176
F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950). The depth of intolerance and
hysteria which accompanied the McCarthy era is illustrated in a statement by Albert Canwell,
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of groups that have been subjected to legislative restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms during periods of social unrest. 13 American
citizens who support the political positions of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) can now be said to have joined this dubious list.14
On December 22, 1987, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1987 (the Act).15 The Act prohibits American citizens from receiv-
chairman of the state of Washington's Un-American Activities Committee: "If someone
insists there is discrimination against Negroes in this country, or that there is inequality of
wealth, there is every reason to believe that person is a communist." C. MCWILLIAMS,
WITCHHUNT 141 (1950). Secondary literature on this important epoch in American history
continues to grow. See, e.g., S. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND
INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982) (providing a critical analysis of governmental policies
and actions); P. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED STATES PROSECUTION
OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-1952 (1984) (arguing that the judicial system, unable to
maintain objectivity, was swept into the hysteria of the age). For a provocative assessment of
FBI activities during this period, see A. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL
SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978).
13. A major theme of this Comment is that freedom of expression and association should
be diligently protected, especially in times of social or political crisis. This, however, is neither
a novel nor an unexplored assertion. See generally L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (arguing that protection
of free expression makes the populace more tolerant in crisis situations); Blasi, supra note 1, at
449-50 (1985) (suggesting that the first amendment be applied absolutely "in those historical
periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are
most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically").
14. The author, an American Jew, in no way supports or endorses the views of the PLO.
Even a casual reading of this Comment should convey that the issue here is the defense of
traditional American political theory and the right to free expression upon which that theory
depends. Challenges to the first amendment do not arise where the speech in question is
popular and conventional; indeed, the first amendment becomes relevant only where the
speech is controversial, factious, and inflammatory.
15. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, Title X, 101 Stat. 1406-07 (codified
at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5203 (West Supp. 1987)). The Anti-Terrorism Act (the Act) went by
several names during its legislative history. Compare Anti-PLO Terrorism Act of 1987, H.R.
2211, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. April 29, 1987) with Terrorist
Organization Exclusion Act of 1987, H.R. 2587, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
H4198 (daily ed. June 3, 1987).
By closing the Palestine Information Office and by attempting to close the PLO consulate
to the United Nations, the United States joined Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
South Africa, and South Korea as the only nations besides Israel which do not in some respect
recognize the PLO as the political representative of the Palestinian people. Hitchins, Minority
Report, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 1987, at 366; see also Kassim, The Palestine Liberation
Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 1 (1980) (arguing that several juridical bases exist by which the PLO, under
international law, can claim to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people). For
a contrary analysis, see Friedlander, The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Anis
Kassim, 10 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 221 (1981) (contending that the terrorist nature of the
PLO precludes its official recognition as the legal representative of the Palestinian people).
Terrorism is a fluidly defined concept that eludes any attempt to place it into a helpful
analytical context. Perhaps the most cynical view is that its definition and application depends
in large part on the relative level of established power that the definer possesses. Too often,
"terrorism" fits the rhetorical stance of an occupier when describing a threat posed by a
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ing any assistance, funds, or "anything of value except informational
materials" from the PLO. 16  Additionally, the Act proscribes the
establishment of offices or other facilities to further the interests of the
PLO.17  Acting originally in anticipation of the passage of the Act,
and subsequently under its authority, the State Department of the
United States permanently closed the Palestine Information Office in
Washington, D.C.,"8 and attempted to close the PLO Observer Mis-
sion to the United Nations in New York City.1 9  Although some
might applaud Congress' action as one of closing the PLO's "terrorist
outposts on U.S. soil," 2 others are concerned that the Act is danger-
resistance group to continued occupation. Ironically, however, the resister may occasionally
adopt the term to describe his own actions. Consider this:
Terrorism is for us a part of the political battle being conducted under the
present circumstances, and it has a great part to play: speaking in a clear voice to
the whole world, as well as to our wretched brethren outside this land, it
proclaims our war against the occupier.
Shammas, The Morning After, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Sept. 29, 1988, at 47. Sham-
mas is quoting current Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir, in an article written for the
Stern Gang's publication Hehazeet (The Front), in 1943.
A more neutral definition describes terrorism as the promotion of violence to achieve or
maintain supremacy. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1255 (2nd ed. 1985). The
inherent vagueness and susceptibility of such a definition to political or other pressures should
give pause to those who claim to know a "terrorist" from a "freedom fighter" with absolute
certitude. Some go as far as to argue that the definition is purely political. See R. FALK,
REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM (1988) (claiming
that the conventional media perception of terrorism is selectively confined to anti-Western
political violence, and does not include equally deadly acts of Western counterterrorism). For
a general overview of terrorism and the various responses by governments, see THE TERROR-
ISM READER: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY (W. Laquer ed. 1980).
16. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp. 1988).
17. Id. Ironically, the Act does not actually proscribe terrorist activities. Such activities
are already proscribed by numerous other federal laws and international treaties. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (espionage); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West Supp. 1988)
(terrorism against United States nationals in foreign countries). The Anti-Terrorism Act does
not enlarge or diminish this body of law in any way, in that acts of terrorism by the PLO or
anyone else against American citizens would be punished in the exact same manner. For a
discussion of possible limitations on the apprehension of terrorists outside the United States'
borders, see Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists.- When Does Apprehension in Violation of
International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 447 (1987).
18. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'g 674 F.
Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1987).
19. United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 695 F. Supp. 1456
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
20. 133 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (letter from Rep. Kemp to Sec. of
State George Shultz calling for greater restrictions on PLO activities in the United States).
Significantly, three of the most prominent Jewish organizations in the United States all openly
opposed the Act. See Miami News, Oct. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 2. The American Jewish
Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
all argued that the Act does not reflect the concerns of the Jewish community and
unnecessarily restricts the rights of American citizens to hear all views on the Middle East. Id.
Additionally, these groups were concerned that the Act would deliver to the PLO an unearned
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ously restrictive legislation.21 By acting to stop American citizens
from spreading the PLO's "ideology of hate and violence,"22 Congress
has raised a number of troublesome constitutional concerns.
First, the Act involves the three branches of the federal govern-
ment in areas of decisionmaking which are not within their traditional
realms of authority, and for which they are ill-suited.23 Through the
Act Congress has restricted the foreign entities with whom the Presi-
dent may establish diplomatic relations, in derogation of the tradi-
tional role of the Executive.24 Additionally, Congress has identified a
particular group and subjected that group to legislatively imposed
penalties, in derogation of the traditional prerogative of the judici-
ary." Finally, the judiciary has been forced into undertaking a deter-
mination of the international responsibilities of the United States in
derogation of the traditional role of the political branches of
government.26
Second, by making it unlawful for American citizens to effec-
tively promote political interests shared by a foreign organization, the
Act imperils two very important first amendment rights: the freedom
to engage in political advocacy over important issues of public con-
cern;27 and the freedom to associate with a political organization and
with others who share that organization's political views.28  These
propaganda victory. Id. Many progressive Jewish leaders and organizations joined in
challenging the constitutionality of the Act. See Complaint at 5-17, Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695
F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88-Civ. 2005 (ELP).
21. See generally Opening One Ear to the P.L.O., N. Y. Times, July 5, 1988, at A16
(lamenting the loss that the American people have suffered in their right to political
information).
22. 133 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (letter from Rep. Kemp to Sec. of
State George Shultz).
23. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-16 (1988).
24. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra notes 213-48 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text. Despite no
explicit mention of the word "association" in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has held
that a right to freedom of association exists that is inviolable by either federal or state
governments. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Americans have always
treasured the right to associate, and in an increasingly diversified world, it is virtually
impossible to have a single voice heard without joining that voice with others. See generally
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964) (noting
that Americans typically associate with a multitude of groups). Thus freedom of association
becomes an integral part of one's exercise of free speech. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965).
The Supreme Court has fully recognized that the right of association is intimately bound
to freedom of speech, and is essential to a free society. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1974) (right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is an integral part of basic constitutional freedom). In reality, a citizen
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rights do not disappear simply because the organization with whom
the American citizens wish to associate is politically unpopular or
based outside the United States.29 By curtailing or prohibiting the
freedom to advocate for and associate with the PLO, the Act violates
the first amendment of the United States Constitution. Third and
finally, by selecting American citizens and others who associate in
specified ways with a named organization, and by imposing legislative
penalties upon those individuals and the organization, Congress has
created a Bill of Attainder which is specifically prohibited by the
Constitution.3 °
This Comment analyzes the constitutional concerns raised by the
Act and ultimately recommends its repeal.3 ' In attempting to appear
tough on terrorism, Congress has created a symbolic document that
does little to stop the actual spread of terrorism, and which threatens
instead to disrupt the peaceful discussion of important political topics
by American citizens.3 2 Section II of this Comment examines the leg-
often expresses an opinion through the organizations with which he or she affiliates. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976) (right to associate for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas essential to the effective advocacy of controversial points of view). For an
interesting analysis of product-association in the marketplace as a self-defining aspect of
contemporary culture, see S. EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1988). Ewen argues that our self-image is increasingly defined by
images of our external associations, including political associations.
29. The first amendment applies regardless of the relative unpopularity of the group with
which an individual wishes to associate. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575
(1974). Freedom of political association, like freedom of speech or of the press, should be
stringently buttressed against encroachment, whether based on the antipathy or distaste of the
public or government, because "[ilt tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the
machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful, orderly change." Id.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.") States are also prohibited from passing Bills of Attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1.
When the states ratified the Constitution, Bills of Attainder were clearly defined: they
were acts of a legislature that sentenced the accused to death. If the punishment meted out
was less than death, the acts were termed bills of pains and penalties. United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946). The constitutional prohibition applies to any legislative act that inflicts
punishment on named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in a manner that
singles them out from others similarly situated without the benefit and safeguards of a judicial
trial. Id. at 315-16.
31. Rep. George Crockett (D-Mich) has introduced legislation that would repeal the Act.
H.R. 4078, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced in 134 CONG. REC. H696 (daily ed.
March 3, 1988)). Both the Department of Justice and the Department of State appear to
support repeal. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1467 n.25.
32. The problems that the "chilling effect" poses to free speech have been acknowledged
and discussed by constitutional scholars representing all viewpoints and ideologies. Compare
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)
(exploring the impact of the chilling effect on political speech from a government-process
perspective) with Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUa. AFF. 204 (1972)
(exploring the impact of the chilling effect from an individual-development perspective). For
1989]
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islative history and relevant language of the Act. Section III then
examines cases that interpret the Act or are otherwise linked to it and
discovers that, in combination, these interpretations work to defeat
the effective advocacy of pro-Palestinian views within the United
States. In addition, Section IV examines the constitutional implica-
tions of the Act and suggests that it cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Finally, Section V concludes that the Act has little useful-
ness other than to further the political fortunes of its sponsors at the
expense of restricting the free expression of politically unpopular
views.33
II. THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987
Congress added the Act to the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for fiscal years 1988-89, without committee hearings and with
only minimal debate. 34 It is divided into four operative sections. Sec-
tion 1002 of the Act contains Congress' findings concerning the ter-
rorist nature of the PLO and its determination that the PLO and its
affiliates are a terrorist organization. 3 Section 1003 of the Act states:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the
an economic analysis of the "costs" of the "chilling effect," see Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 47 (1986).
33. Virtually all newspapers and journals that have discussed the Anti-Terrorism Act have
noted and commented that this has been the clear effect of the legislation. See, e.g., Opening
One Ear to the P.L.O., N. Y. Times, July 5, 1988, at A16; Jacoby, Is Uncle Sam Outlaw?
Bending the Global Rules, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1988, at 61; Nobody's Talking, THE NATION,
Jan. 9, 1988, at 4; Meese Expected to Order PLO to Shut U.N. Mission, Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 11, 1988, at 45; Notebook, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 4, 1988, at 9; Greenberger, Bill
Requiring Closure of PLO's Washington, UN. Offices May Be Propaganda Blow to US., Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 24, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
34. The Act was added to an omnibus foreign relations spending bill, on the floor of the
Senate on October 8, 1987. See 133 CONG. REC. S13,855 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987). At the time,
several senators noted the need to explore the constitutional issues raised by the Act in more
depth, including Senator Bingaman, who stated: "We need to further explore the issues raised
by this amendment. It is an amendment that has not had any hearings, has not been
considered in committee, and one that raises very serious issues of constitutional rights ......
Representative Kemp first introduced the Act in the House of Representatives on April 27,
1987, citing his failed attempts to have the State Department close the "terrorist outposts on
U.S. soil." 133 Cong. Rec. E1635 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987). It received vigorous support from
both conservatives, and liberals alike. Consider this exchange by then-presidential candidate
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.):
[Senator Dole:] Ted, will you join me in sending a bipartisan message to the
P.L.O.? There's just no room in this land for international terrorists.
[Senator Kennedy:] Right on, Bob. If the Reagan Administration won't take
away their welcome mat, Congress will.
(Hitchens, Minority Report, THE NATION, Oct. 10, 1987, at 366.)
35. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5201(a) (West Supp. 1988). Congress found, among other things, that:
(1) terrorism in the Middle East accounts for 60% of all international terrorism; (2) the PLO
was directly responsible for the death of dozens of American citizens, including Leon
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Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups
(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from
the PLO ... or agents thereof;
(2) to expend funds from the PLO... ; or
(3) to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises or
other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the
United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds pro-
vided.by the [PLO].36
In addition, Section 1004 of the Act empowers the Attorney General
to take all necessary steps to effectuate the Act, making no attempt to
limit the Executive's choice of actions in reaching this end.3" Finally,
Section 1005 provides that the President may terminate the provisions
of the Act by certifying to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House that the PLO no longer practices or
supports terrorism.
38
III. CASES INVOLVING OR TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
A. Setting the Stage
The first case relating to the Act, Palestine Information Office v.
Shultz, 39 did not arise under the Act itself, but rather in reaction to its
pending passage. Then-Secretary of State George Shultz, apparently
worried about the constitutional and international law ramifications
of the pending legislation, sought to placate its sponsors by closing the
Palestine Information Office in Washington, D.C.4°
Klinghoffer, a passenger aboard the Achille Lauro in 1985; and (3) the PLO is dedicated to the
armed liberation of Palestine. Id.
36. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp. 1988). In addition to being the pivotal provision of
the ATA, it is the most troubling section in respect to the first amendment rights of free speech
and association.
37. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5203 (West Supp. 1988). Attorney General Edwin Meese implemented
the Act by ordering the closing of the PLO's observer mission to the United Nations. United
States v. Palestine Liberation Office, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). This was done
despite prior opposition from the State Department, see 133 Cong. Rec. E1635 (daily ed. Apr.
29, 1987) (letter from Sec. of State Shultz to Rep. Kemp arguing that the closure would violate
international law), and an overwhelming show of unanimity in opposition to the closing by the
United Nations General Assembly. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host
Country, G.A. Res. 229, U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/229 (1988). See also UN CHRONICLE, June
1988, at 36 (vote 143 to 1, Israel in opposition, U.S. abstaining).
38. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5204 (West Supp. 1988).
39. 674 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. This has been widely recognized as the primary motivation behind the closing of the
Palestine Information Office. Greenberger, Bill Requiring Closure of PLO's Washington Office
May be Propaganda Blow to U.S., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 24, 1987, at 28, col. 1. Shultz'
reversal on the constitutionality of the Information Office closing is remarkable. In his reply to
1989] ,.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
1. PALESTINE INFORMATION OFFICE V SHULTZ
The Palestine Information Office had operated peacefully and
with little notice in Washington, D.C., since its establishment in
1978. 4 1 The Information Office was staffed by its director, Hasan
Abdel Rahman, a United States citizen, and eight employees, who
were either United States citizens or legal permanent aliens.42  The
office disseminated information and arranged lectures and seminars in
order to make known the views of the Palestinian people inside of the
United States.4 3 Although the Information Office did not have any
diplomatic status, both it and its director were registered under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)" as agents of the PLO.45
As required by FARA, the Information Office regularly filed registra-
a letter from Representative Kemp calling for greater restrictions on the activities of the PLO,
Shultz wrote:
(S]o long as [the Palestine Information Office] regularly files reports with the
Department of Justice on its activities as an agent of a foreign organization,
complies with all other relevant U.S. laws, and is staffed by Americans or legal
resident aliens, it is entitled to operate under the protection provided by the First
Amendment of the Constitution.
133 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987). Shultz' animosity towards the Act contin-
ues. He has recently been quoted as describing the Act as "one of the dumber things Congress
has done lately." Binnis, Judge Rules PLO Mission Can Stay, NAT'L L. GUILD NOTES, Sept./
Oct. 1988, at 10.
41. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 914. The $350,000 annual budget of the
Information Office was paid for by the Palestine National Fund, which was identified as the
finance department of the PLO. Id. This fund is controlled by a Board of Directors appointed
by the Palestine National Council, which plaintiffs claim functions as a Parliament for
Palestinians. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 8, n.4, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz,
853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398).
42. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
43. Id. at 935. Writers sympathetic to the Palestinian cause note the difficulty in bringing
their views to the attention of the American public. See N. CHOMSKY, THE FATEFUL
TRIANGLE: THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND THE PALESTINIANS 39-80 (1983) (contending
that the U.S. has adopted a "rejectionist" view that the rights of the Palestinian people are less
in value than the rights of the Israeli people); A. COCKBURN, CORRUPTIONS OF EMPIRE (1987)
(citing the lack of balanced coverage in the mainstream media about the Middle East); M.
PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: POLITICS AND THE MASS MEDIA (1986) (claiming that the
mass media largely follows governmental and corporate interpretations of foreign events). For
a discussion of the difficulties facing both Israelis and Palestinians who wish to engage in a
peaceful dialogue, see D. GROSSMAN, THE YELLOW WIND (H. Watzman trans. 1988).
44. Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 914. The FARA requires all persons or
groups employed in the United States by a foreign principal for the purpose of disseminating
propaganda to register with the Secretary of State. 22 U.S.C. § 611-21. A "foreign principal"
is defined in the FARA as the government of a foreign country, or any foreign organization,
business, association, corporation, or partnership. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b). Because the FARA
also requires that certain materials be labeled political propaganda, it has been criticized for
exerting a "chilling effect" on the exercise of free speech. See Note, The "Political
Propaganda" Label Under FARA: Abridgement of Free Speech or Legitimate Regulation?, 41
U. MIAMI L. REV. 591 (1987).
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tion statements with the Department of Justice, and described itself in
its most recent statement as an organization dedicated to "bring[ing]
the views of the Palestinian people ... to the attention of the Ameri-
can people."46 Mr. Rahman, in his capacity as director of the Infor-
mation Office, arranged meetings, attended academic conferences, and
responded to written and oral inquiries from groups and individuals
concerned about' Palestinian issues.
47
On September 15, 1987, the State Department informed the
Information Office that it had been "designated" a foreign mission
and would have to shut down its operation within thirty days.4 8 The
shut-down was ordered despite the fact that the Information Office
had never been accused of any unlawful conduct at any point in its
operating history.49 The State Department ordered the Information
Office closed under the authority of the Foreign Missions Act
(FMA),5° which confers on the State Department the power to regu-
late "foreign missions" within the United States."1 In response, the
Information Office sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment
in the district court to block the closing, 2 arguing that the State
Department had exceeded its authority under the FMA, and that the
decision to close the office violated the first amendment rights of free-
dom of speech and freedom of association of the Information Office
and its staff.
5 3
Adopting a narrow scope of review, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia concerned itself only with the Sec-
retary of State's discretion under the FMA, and not ostensibly with
46. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398).
47. Id.
48. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 935.
49. See id. at 946 (Silberman, J., concurring). Judge Silberman noted that the Information
Office engaged in no behavior other than the dissemination of information. Id.
50. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 935. See 22 U.S.C. § 4301(c) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (Foreign Missions Act).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 4301(c). The FMA defines a "foreign mission" as:
[A]ny mission to or agency or entity in the United States which is involved in the
diplomatic, consular, or other activities of, or which is substantially owned or
effectively controlled by- (A) a foreign government, or (B) an organization...
representing a territory or political entity which has been granted diplomatic or
other official privileges and immunities under the laws of the United States or
which engages in some aspect of the conduct of the international affairs of such
territory or political entity.
22 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
52. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 915.
53. Id. The district court found unpersuasive plaintiff's argument that the Information
Office had never received nor sought any diplomatic status, nor engaged in any diplomatic
activity. Id. at 916.
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the substantive elements of his decision.5 4 From the outset the court
noted that, through the FMA, Congress empowered the Secretary of
State with broad authority to regulate foreign missions in the United
States." In addition, the court noted the all-inclusive nature of the
FMA in respect to the entities it regulated.56 Under the FMA, a
"foreign mission" is "any mission . .. agency or entity" that is
involved in the "diplomatic, consular, or other activities of, or which
is substantially owned or effectively controlled" by a foreign govern-
ment or political organization representing a territory that has been
granted diplomatic or other official privileges in the United States. 57
In holding that the Information Office constituted an "entity" for pur-
poses of the FMA, the district court relied on the "other activities"
that the Information Office performed for the benefit of the PLO.58
Specifically, the court described these "other activities" as "the polit-
ical activities and political propaganda" that the Information Office
engaged in, and concluded that these activities were sufficient to trig-
ger the State Department's authority under the FMA. 9
The district court, however, paid only cursory attention to the
first amendment claims of the Information Office and its staff.' It
dismissed any attempt by the Information Office or amici to charac-
terize the State Department's actions as regulating political advocacy,
ruling that the closure order "merely prohibits the [Information
Office] from operating as a 'foreign mission' of the PLO."'6'
Accepting for purposes of argument that the Information Office and
its staff had demonstrated some impingement of their first amendment
rights, the district court applied a balancing test, weighing the plain-
tiffs' first amendment rights against the government's countervailing
interests.62 This balancing test, first enunciated in United States v.
54. Id. at 916.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 917.
57. 22 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
58. Palestine Information Office, 674 F.Supp. at 917. The district court acted in spite of
the fact that no previous case existed in which the FMA was applied against United States
citizens whose activities were otherwise regulated under the FARA.
59. Id. at 917. Plaintiffs argued that "other activities" had never been previously
interpreted by the State Department as simple political advocacy. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, at 1, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No.
87-5398). They also argued that the legislative history of the FMA never intended such a
broad definition of the term. Id.
60. Id. at 918. The court found the FMA to be content-neutral on its face and to be "no
burden" on free expression. Id. at 918-19. The court concluded that while the issues raised by
the plaintiffs were serious, their assertion in this case was "utterly meritless." Id. at 920.
61. Id. at 918.
62. Id. at 918-19. The court seemed to reject the suggestion that there was even a minimal
impact on the plaintiffs' right to freedom of expression as a result of the Department's action,
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O'Brien," is applied when a strong and compelling governmental
interest allegedly conflicts with an asserted constitutional right."
Under the O'Brien balancing test, a court will uphold an incidental
restriction on speech if 1) the regulation is within the government's
constitutional power; 2) a substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of speech is furthered; 3) the furtherance of this
interest results in only an incidental restriction on freedom of speech;
and 4) the incidental restriction is no greater than essential to further
the governmental interest.65
Applying the balancing test, the district court held the State
Department's action to be within the foreign affairs power of the
Executive and found the governmental interest in furthering the
foreign policy goals of the United States to be compelling.6 6 Specifi-
cally, the district court found that this interest overrode any inciden-
tal restriction on the first amendment rights of the plaintiffs.67
Accordingly, the court then granted summary judgment to the United
States.68
Unfortunately, the district court's decision leaves unanswered
many questions that still linger, even after appellate review and in
light of the subsequent passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. For
instance, the court wrote that the plaintiffs were "in no way pre-
vent[ed] ... from debating political issues."' 69 Yet, without further
guidance from the court on how to structure his activities in order to
avoid application of the FMA, how is Mr. Rahman to open an office
without facing its imminent closure? If Mr. Rahman still retains his
full first amendment rights as an individual, a denial of his ability to
rent an office and work with others who share his political views is
unavoidably an impingement on his right to political expression. Sig-
stating: "[t]here is no burden on protected expression as a result of the designation [of the
Information Office as a foreign mission]." Id. at 918.
63. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
64. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 918.
65. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
66. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 919. The district court stated that "[t]he
Secretary determined that the order was necessary to further the foreign policy interests of the
United States, and thus was archetypically designed to promote a compelling governmental
interest." Id. This is typical of the minimal inquiry into the motive of the statute under the
O'Brien rationale. The court was satisfied that so long as the Act was within the power of the
legislature, it was therefore constitutional regardless of the actual motive. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 21, § 12-7 at 824 (courts under O'Brien are reluctant to examine motive, yet
motive is routinely examined in numerous other constitutional contexts). Professor John Hart
Ely has described the search for legislative motive as "charades... inevitably unconvincing."
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 126 (1978).
67. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 919.
68. Id. at 920.
69. Id. at 919.
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nificantly, Mr. Rahman argued that he did not "seek or receive regu-
lar instructions from the PLO on how to perform [his] job or run the
office."' 70 Additionally, the League of Arab States, of which the PLO
is only a single member, paid his salary.7' Therefore, other nations,
not the PLO, principally paid his fees. 72 Thus, rather than rely upon
the language of the FMA that confers authority on the State Depart-
ment to regulate entities that are substantially owned or controlled by
foreign governments or organizations, the district court explicitly
relied upon the "other activities" language of FMA in upholding the
closure. 73 These other activities specifically consisted of "the political
activities and political propaganda" in which the office was engaged.74
In light of the fact that the State Department invoked its authority
merely on the basis of this expressive activity, it seems anomalous for
the district court to have ignored the obvious impact that sustaining
the closure would have on the plaintiff's future political activity.
2. PALESTINE INFORMATION OFFICE V. SHULTZ (APPELLATE)
The Information Office and its staff appealed the district court's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, renewing their arguments that the decision to close the
Information Office exceeded the authority of the State Department
under the FMA, and that the decision of the district court was funda-
mentally inconsistent with the first amendment. 75 The D.C. Circuit
70. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 935.
71. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8 n.4, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d
932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398).
72. Id.
73. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 917.
74. Id.
75. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 938-39. The Information Office also made a
due process claim under the fifth amendment, arguing that the FMA is too vague for citizens
to understand when it may apply, and that the Information Office and the citizens who
comprise it suffered a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights without adequate notice
or hearing. Id. at 943-44. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the vagueness claim by holding that the
ordinary requirements of legislative specificity are lessened in the foreign affairs context, and
that the FMA is less vague than other statutes that have been judged constitutional. Id. at
944.
The D.C. Circuit, however, failed to differentiate foreign policy actions that involve only
foreign governments or entities, and their agents, and those that constrict the rights of
American citizens. When rights of Americans within the United States are threatened by
executive action, the statute must be sufficiently clear and unambiguous. See United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972); cf. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d
1043, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987) (per curiam) (stating that criteria for
State Department operation must be sufficient for the courts to monitor executive action).
"Substantial control," as defined by the D.C. Circuit in Palestine Information Office, is
not limited to official representation by the foreign government or entity. This broadens the
inquiry in future cases arising under the FMA to include potential indicia of control, such as
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upheld the district court ruling, conducting a textual analysis of the
FMA similar to the one conducted by the district court. However,
the D.C. Circuit departed in part from the district court's application
of the FMA and explored in more depth the constitutional claims
involved.76
Noting that the FMA operated in the subtle realm where foreign
policy matters "brush up" against rights of free speech and free
expression, 77 the court commented on how truly difficult cases could
some day arise under the FMA. 78 The court then refused, however,
to characterize Palestine Information Office as such a case. 79 Depart-
ing from the district court's application of the FMA, the D.C. Circuit
oral assertions made in telephone conversations, statements in letters, expressions of affiliation
in ideas or outlook made in public forums, and a whole host of other subjective factors not
susceptible of objective measurement. This is in addition to the test employed by the district
court, that the Information Office engaged in "other activities," which was never repudiated by
the D.C. Circuit. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 917-18. Minimum standards of
specificity demand language that conveys "sufficiently definite warning as to proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341
U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim simply by holding
that "foreign missions" have no due process rights. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp.
at 919. But this holding begs the question: specifically, whether the State Department
incorrectly characterized the Information Office as a "foreign mission," and whether the
Information Office may contest a designation made under the Foreign Missions Act.
Challenges to statutes based on vagueness rest ultimately on the procedural due process
requirement of adequate notice. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 (1 lth ed. 1985).
76. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 939-44.
77. Id. at 935. The court gives no other instances where the "realm" of foreign policy, free
speech, and free expression "brush up" against each other. The court could have suggested the
regrettable internment of American citizens of Japanese descent in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the deprivation of freedoms in pursuit of foreign policy
goals was both explicit and unfortunate. Korematsu shares several parallels with the present
case. Both were decisions made by the Executive in a time of "crisis," both singled out for
penalties a particular politically disfavored group, and both were upheld by decisions that
relied on a technical analysis of the power that was exercised rather than a substantive analysis
of the rights which were affected. Tribe has described Korematsu as an example of "the
nefarious impact that war and racism can have on institutional integrity and cultural health."
L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 16-6, at 1452.
78. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 935. The court noted that "truly difficult"
cases might arise under the FMA where "a domestic organization that arguably did not belong
in that category" is nonetheless placed in the category of a "foreign mission." Id. Thus the
D.C. Circuit envisioned some limits on the discretion of the State Department, but failed to
state at what point the State Department would exceed its discretion. Rather, the court relied
heavily on § 4302(b), which states that "[d]eterminations with respect to the meaning and
applicability of the terms used [in the Act] shall be committed to the discretion of the
Secretary." 22 U.S.C. § 4302(b). Reliance on § 4302(b) ignores the point that it is the courts
which must decide when the Executive and Congress have exceeded their constitutional
authority. To say that Congress has delegated to the State Department broad interpretive
authority ignores the obvious truth that Congress cannot delegate authority to engage in
actions that are unconstitutional.
79. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 935.
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found a sufficient basis for the State Department's determination that
the Information Office was a "foreign mission," substantially owned
or controlled by the PLO, stressing that the Information Office was
largely funded by the PLO and that its director regularly met with
leaders from that organization.80 The court deferred to the authority
granted to the State Department when making its actual determina-
tion, stressing that the State Department was acting under the com-
bined power of both the executive and legislative branches.81
Accordingly, the court found the designation of the Information
Office as an "entity" to be sound given the State Department's discre-
tion and the expansive meaning of the term "entity," and refused to
be constrained by legislative history over its intended use that sug-
gested otherwise. 82 Addressing the impact the FMA would have on
80. Id. at 935. The plaintiffs admitted receiving funds from the Palestine National Fund.
Id. They sought to distinguish funding from ownership, however, by arguing that the
Information Office was free to use the funds in any manner it saw fit. Likening the relationship
between the PLO and the Information Office to a grantor-grantee relationship, plaintiffs
argued that a grantor is not usually considered to own the organization that it funds. Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24 n.12, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398).
Plaintiffs also sought to discount the director's regular meetings with the PLO. Id.
Conceding that as an "agent" of the PLO Rahman discussed Palestinian issues with
representatives of the PLO on a regular basis, plaintiffs nonetheless argued that Rahman did
not seek or receive instructions from the PLO on how to perform his job or run the office. Id.
According to the plaintiffs, the PLO did not approve Rahman's speeches or speaking schedule.
Nor did the PLO dictate whom he could or should hire to work in the office. Id.
81. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 937. The court is referring to Justice
Jackson's famous description of executive power in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981).
82. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 937-38. Plaintiffs argued that the term
"entity," added to the Act by amendment in 1986, only referred to "commercial entities." Id.
at 937. The court held that this conflicted with the "plain meaning" of the statute, and
adopted the principle of statutory construction that words are ordinarily to be given their
"plain meaning." Id. Unfortunately, the meaning of "entity" is anything but plain. One
dictionary defines an entity as "being, existence; esp: independent, separate, or self contained
existence." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 758 (1981). Although
the Information Office is certainly an "entity" under this definition, arguably so is a person, a
dog, or a Thanksgiving turkey. Under the FMA, an "entity" that is engaged in "other
activities" or "substantially controlled" by a foreign government or principle could be
designated a foreign mission and ordered to close. 22 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(4). When the district
court held that "entity" is an "all-inclusive" term, it adopted a standard that is both vague and
overbroad, especially in light of the strong first amendment interests involved. Palestine
Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 910. In United States v. Cohen, 255 U.S. 81 (1921), the
Court established that a statute must be definite enough for persons to whom it is addressed to
know the relevant standard of conduct and address themselves accordingly. Id. at 89. A
statute which reaches into protected activities may be given a saving construction, but only
where a precise category of protected conduct can be clearly stated to fall outside the newly
reconstructed statute. In giving a statute effect, the courts will not rewrite or pervert its
purpose. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964). In holding
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the individuals involved, the court stated that "[t]hemere fact that an
office is staffed in part by American citizens and that it does not call
itself a foreign mission does not remove it from the State Depart-
ment's reach under the [FMA].
'8 s
The Information Office and its staff also renewed their contention
that their right to associate with the PLO, their right to free speech,
and their right to receive information had been abridged.84 Although
the court was more solicitous of the plaintiff's first amendment
claims, it ultimately agreed with the district court that no protected
right of the plaintiffs had been violated, since the closure only pre-
vented the individual appellants from speaking as a foreign mission of
the PLO. s5
In conducting its first amendment analysis, the court first noted
that both speech and nonspeech elements were involved, calling for
the application of the O'Brien test.86 The court, however, never
clearly stated what the nonspeech elements of the plaintiff's conduct
unconstitutional a state department restriction on the issuance of passports to travel abroad in
Aptheker, the Supreme Court wrote:
[A]n attempt to "construe" the statute [at issue] and probe its recesses for some
core of constitutionality would inject an element of vagueness into the statute's
scope and application; the plain words would thus become uncertain in meaning
only if courts proceeded on a case-by-case basis to separate out constitutional
from unconstitutional areas of coverage. This course would not be proper, or
desirable, in dealing with a restriction which so severely curtails personal liberty.
The FMA, as well as the Palestine Information Office cases, provide little guidance on the
circumstances under which a political advocate or advocacy group with ties or sympathies to
foreign organizations can be ordered to cease operations. The statute can thus be a very dan-
gerous tool if applied against real or perceived political enemies by a malevolent Executive,
with no corresponding checks placed upon its execution by the courts. Justice Powell
explained the vagueness doctrine's special relevance in the first amendment context as
requir[ing] legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement offi-
cials and triers of fact in order to prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment." Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amend-
ment, the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in
other contexts.
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (footnotes and citations omitted); see also
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) ("It would certainly be dangerous if the legisla-
ture could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to
step inside and say who could be rightfully retained, and who should be set at large.").
83. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 939. This is the key step taken by the
Palestine Information Office court which the PLO and Mendelsohn court refused to take.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The district court asserted
that the O'Brien test applies "[fin situations where a strong and compelling governmental
interest allegedly conflicts with an asserted constitutional right." Palestine Information Office,
674 F. Supp. at 918. The O'Brien test, however, should apply if speech is incidental to
conduct, and as the district court noted, the Information Office was closed simply because it
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were, although it concluded that the representation of a foreign entity
is "conduct" within the meaning of O'Brien.7 Effectively, the court's
decision guarantees that no "entity" declared by the State Depart-
ment to be a foreign mission will ever receive the full protections of
the first amendment. Rather, an O'Brien balancing test will be
applied, regardless of whether that "entity" actually engages in "con-
duct," or does nothing more than write articles for academic journals.
The court also applied the O'Brien test because it held that the FMA
was not a content-based restriction on free speech."8 In analyzing the
FMA apart from its application in the particular case, however, the
court ignores the potential application of the FMA in a content-based
manner by the State Department.
Without addressing the potential for content-based application of
the FMA, the court upheld the closure, finding that all four parts to
the O'Brien test had been met.89 First, the court held that the closure
of a foreign mission by the executive branch-pursuant to an express
congressional grant of authority-was clearly within the broad for-
eign policy power of the national government.90 Yet, in holding that
the government possessed the power to close foreign missions, the
court ignored precisely the issue that the plaintiffs were contending-
specifically, whether the Information Office was a "foreign mission."
To state that the government has the constitutional power to close a
"foreign mission" does not answer whether the government may close
the Information Office as it was constituted. Second, the court held
that the State Department's action furthered an important govern-
mental interest.9 The court held that this compelling interest was the
closure of foreign missions that the United States does not recog-
acted as a political advocate on behalf of the PLO. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697,
703-04 (1968).
87. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 939.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 940. The FMA is ambiguous, however, because it fails to clarify exactly what
actions will trigger its application. Because it is "assume[d] that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, laws must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Information Office had no way of knowing whether
the FMA would be applied to it, and it was without guidelines on how to structure its conduct
so as to avoid the Act's future application. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39, Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398). When first
amendment freedoms are involved, the courts must insure that "explicit standards exist for
those who apply them." Id. at 108. Accord Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983);
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974).
90. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 940.
91. Id.
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nize.92 Third, the court held that the interest in closing foreign mis-
sions hostile to our interests is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. 93 This was deemed so despite the fact that the State
Department had won in the district court because the principle activ-
ity of the Information Office, political advocacy, was the basis for
finding that the Office was a foreign mission.94 Fourth and finally, the
court found the restriction on free speech to be narrowly tailored to
least burden the first amendment. 95
The court briefly discussed the Information Office's right of asso-
ciation claim. 96 Appellants may freely associate with other Ameri-
cans who share their views, the court asserted, they just may not do so
as a mission representing the PLO.97 On whether appellants may
continue to associate with the PLO, the court stated that they may do
so as long as they not act as the organization's foreign mission."a
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. 910, 917 (D.D.C. 1987).
95. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 940.
96. Id. at 940-41. The court held that Rahman may associate with those he had previously
associated with and promote the same exact political ends as before. Id. But it is by no means
plain how Rahman may do this without again running the risk of closure under the FMA.
The D.C. Circuit's opinion provided little guidance in this area, dispensing quickly with
Rahman's right to associate with other individuals. Id. at 940-42. The Information Office was
designated a "foreign mission" by the district court precisely because of its "other activities"-
namely political advocacy. Palestine Information Office, 674 F. Supp. at 917. It seems evident
that should Rahman and others establish an office to promote the political views of the PLO, it
would be labeled a "foreign mission" and ordered to close as well. Even if one adopts the D.C.
Circuit's test of "substantial control," it is unclear what amount of funding by sympathetic
foreign organizations is permitted, and how many communications with foreign leaders are
allowed before an office can escape being declared "substantially controlled" by a foreign
principal.
97. Id. The district court has embraced two contradictory notions: First, the court has
informed the individuals that comprise the Information Office that they may continue to
advocate their political views as they have done in the past. Palestine Information Office, 674
F. Supp. at 918. Conversely, the court has informed these individuals that their previous
political activity justifies the government's closure order. Id. at 917. See Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 40, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No.
87-5398). This circular reasoning deprives the first amendment of the breathing space it needs
to survive. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
98. Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 941. The court has effectively converted the
FMA into a standardless licensing scheme which the government could apply to virtually any
United States citizen that acted as a foreign agent. Theoretically, there is nothing that
prevents a public relations firm that does work for a foreign government from being closed for
the same reasons that the State Department closed the Information Office. Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 41, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir.1988) (No.
87-5398). The Supreme Court has condemned discretionary licensing schemes that impinge on
first amendment rights on many occasions. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1951); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). Given that the Information Office engaged primarily in
political speech, the closure can be seen as a crude but effective form of prior restraint.
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The D.C. Circuit's expansive reading of the FMA and the court's
concomitant technical analysis of the constitutional issues raised pre-
saged a conflict with the method of analysis used in the cases arising
under the Anti-Terrorism Act itself.
B. The Anti-Terrorism Act Cases
Two cases, both decided by the same court on the same day,
sought to test the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act. In
United States v. PLO,99  the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the Act could not be con-
strued to close the PLO's observer mission in New York City. °° In
Mendelsohn v. Meese,10 the same court held that the Act does not
abridge the PLO's first amendment rights to free speech and associa-
tion, and that the Anti-Terrorism Act does not operate as a Bill of
Attainder on American citizens who support the political views of the
PLO. 102
1. UNITED STATES V. PLO
In PLO, the question before the court was whether the Act over-
rode the Headquarters Agreement, 0 3 under which the United
Nations established its headquarters in New York City.' °" The
United States sought a permanent injunction to close the PLO's
United Nations mission, arguing that the Act superseded any previ-
ous treaty or agreement.105 The PLO 06 argued that Section 21 of the
99. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y; 1988).
100. Id. at 1464.
101. Id. at 1474.
102. Id. at 1490.
103. 61 Stat. 756, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11. The United Nations invited the PLO
to establish an Observer Mission in 1974. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 31 (No.
108), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
104. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1458.
105. Id. at 1460.
106. The mission's representatives were also defendants in their individual capacity. Id. at
1460. The four individual defendants besides the PLO were: the Permanent Observer of the
PLO to the United Nations, Zuhdi Labib Terzi; the Deputy Permanent Observer of the PLO
to the United Nations, Riyad H. Mansour, who is also a United States citizen; the Alternate
Permanent Observer of the PLO to the United Nations, Nasser AI-Kidwa; and a mission
administrator, Veronica Kanaan Pugh.
At oral argument, United States Attorney Rudolf Giuliani argued that Congress intended
to close down all offices operated by the PLO in the United States, stating that the legislative
history is replete with statements that the purpose of the Act was to shut down the Observer
Mission. New York Law Journal, June 9, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (discussing the arguments made by
the attorneys before the court). This may have led the court to admonish Congress for failing
to include explicitly the PLO observer mission if their intent was to do so. PLO, 695 F. Supp.
at 1468-69.
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Headquarters Agreement mandated that any dispute between the
United States and the United Nations be referred to a special multina-
tional tribunal, 107 and that closure of the observer mission would vio-
late the Headquarters Agreement given that this was not
contemplated by Congress nor required by the statute.1
0 8
The district court first dispensed with the alleged United Nations
arbitration obligation, stressing that the international nature of the
dispute distinguished this agreement from other traditional agree-
ments to arbitrate.' °9 Expressing reluctance to involve itself in mat-
ters of international policy,°10 the district court held that the question
of whether the dispute should properly have been submitted to the
multinational tribunal was a question better left to the political
branches of government and therefore was outside the scope of judi-
cial review."I As to whether Section 21 deprived United States
courts from subject matter jurisdiction over disputes of this kind, the
district court emphatically held that it did not. 112 First, the dispute
was not between the United States and the United Nations per se;
therefore on its face Section 21 was inapplicable."' Second, the
courts are under a constitutionally mandated duty to decide "what
the law is.""' 4 Any interpretation of the Act must fall to United
States courts, since the district court could not direct the United
107.' Id. at 1461. Essentially, the defendants and amici (including the United Nations) were
urging the court to defer to an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Id.
(citing Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (April 26, 1988) (U.N. v. U.S.)). The
International Court of Justice interpreted Section 21 to require that any dispute concerning the
application of the Headquarters Agreement in respect to the Act shall be referred to a special
arbitral tribunal. In essence, this would leave the decision of whether the Act superseded the
Headquarters Agreement to the tribunal. Id. at 1461-62. The court held that directing the
United States to an international arbitral tribunal would exceed the scope of the court's Article
III powers. Id. at 1462. Resolution of arbitration is a political question and not a question
appropriate for the courts. Id. at 1463. Additionally, treating the Headquarters Agreement as
a rule of decision would require the courts to refrain from undertaking their constitutionally-
mandated function to decide what the law is. Id. at 1464.
108. Id. at 1461. Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark argued this point before the
court, concentrating on the intent of Congress not to violate any international law when
drafting the Act. New York Law Journal, June 9, 1988 at 1, col. 4.
109. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462.
110. Id. The court wrote that in matters of international policy, courts generally may not
participate because "[t]hese questions do not lend themselves to resolution by adjudication
under our jurisprudence." Id.
Ill. Id. at 1463. The court therefore addressed whether the "political question" doctrine
precluded adjudication. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221,
229-30 (1986); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962).
112. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462.
113. Id.
114. Id. This is the flip-side to the court's separation of powers argument: a branch may
not refuse to exercise its own power once delegated. Id. at 1464 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
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States to submit to arbitration without exceeding the powers granted
it under article III of the Constitution."1 5 The district court therefore
held that the political question doctrine was inapplicable and did not
prevent the court from interpreting both the Headquarters Agreement
and the Act.'
1 6
The district court next examined whether the Act superseded the
Headquarters Agreement. 1 7 It started by noting that both are the
"supreme law of the land" and that the Constitution provides no
order of precedence among them. 1 The district court reviewed the
legislative history of the Act and failed to find any clear evidence that
Congress intended the Act to supersede the Headquarters Agree-
ment.119 The only way to reconcile the two, the district court con-
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department, to say what the law is.")).
115. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462.
116. In Japan Whaling, the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of
Commerce to impose sanctions against Japan for exceeding the limits for whale hunting set by
the International Whaling Commission. 478 U.S. at 223. Under federal statutory law, the
Secretary was required to certify Japan for sanctions if Japan's whaling practices violated the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Id. at 225-26. Rather than certify
Japan for sanctions, the Secretary of Commerce negotiated an executive agreement under
which Japan agreed to interim limits on hunting with an eventual elimination of all
commercial whaling by 1988. Id. at 227-28. Several conservation groups brought suit
contending that the Secretary's actions conflicted with the duties imposed by the statutes. Id.
at 228. The Supreme Court rejected the argument of the Japanese petitioners that the
Secretary's actions were not subject to judicial review under the political question doctrine. Id.
at 229. The Court held that the political question doctrine does not prevent interpretation of a
federal statute concerning the Executive's duties under the statute simply because the
interpretation touches upon the Executive's relations with foreign governments. Id. at 230.
It is not clear how this conclusion can be reconciled with the district court's refusal to
decide whether the United States was required to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of an
international arbitral tribunal. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462. Arguably, the question presented
was simply one of statutory interpretation concerning the judiciary's duty under the statute.
The court expressed a decided animosity towards any doctrine which functioned as a "rule of
decision" in derogation of United States court's constitutionally mandated duty to decide
"what the law is." Id. at 1463-64. The political question doctrine itself, however, always
functions as a rule of decision because it decides the case through refusal to hear its merits.
Similarly, a court is only consitutionally mandated to decide a case when it is not a political
question. Cf Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230; Baker, 368 U.S. at 210-11; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 170-71.
117. The court seemed puzzled by the Act, describing it as having "a unique nature," and
noting that it was "unable to find any comparable statute in the long history of Congressional
enactments." PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
118. Id. at 1464.
119. Id. at 1465, 1471. Under traditional statutory construction, when a statute and a
treaty are in conflict both are to be given effect, if practicable. See Trans World Airlines v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984). But when a treaty is irreconcilable with a later
statute, the treaty may be given effect only if Congress has not expressed a clear intent to
supersede the treaty by the enaction of the statute. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (holding that Congress had no intent to supersede
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cluded, was to hold the Act inapplicable to the PLO observer
mission.' 20  The district court determined that the Headquarters
Agreement required the United States to permit the United Nations
to invite whomever it wished as observers, and that the United States
must respect that decision by not impeding the transit of these observ-
ers in the normal course of United Nations activity. 121 As a result of
this interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States
was obligated to refrain from interfering with the observer mission to
the United Nations. 22 The district court admonished Congress for
failing to specify clearly whether the Act was meant to include the
United Nations mission 123 and admitted that courts must sometimes
go to great lengths to avoid domestic statutes from conflicting with
any prior international treaties or agreements. 24 Thus, the court was
willing to go beyond the "plain wording" of the Act and attempted to
truly determine the principal motivations of Congress. This contrasts
strongly with the refusal of the courts in Palestine Information Office
treaty); cf The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 599-602 (1889) (finding a clear intent to
abrogate existing treaty).
Unfortunately, the government's argument for the abrogation of the Headquarters
Agreement neglected to address whether abrogation would be useful, desirable, or in the best
interests of the United States as a matter of policy. Although many commentators have
argued that the United Nations has outlived its utility to the United States, the pressure that
the Anti-Terrorism Act placed on the United Nations to move its headquarters was not among
the reasons put forth by the Congressmen who ultimately voted for the Act. For an editorial
condemning the political machinations behind the Act, see Notebook, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Jan. 4, 1988, stating:
For our part, we wouldn't mind if the U.N. would remove itself from New York
to Ouagadougou, taking with it the entire gasbag Philharmonic of which the
PLO is only one player. But if the U.N. is to stay in New York, it's got to be
allowed to accredit whom it wants.
Id. at 9.
120. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468, 1471.
121. Id. at 1465. This results both from the language of the Agreement and from the
United States' uninterrupted performance, for forty years, of refraining from impeding the
functions of observer missions to the United Nations. Id. at 1465-66.
122. Id. at 1468.
123. Id. at 1468-69. The court concluded that Congress was forewarned of the possibility of
the Act's application to the PLO Observer Mission and of its potential conflict with the
Headquarters Agreement, but specifically neglected to include mention of either the Mission or
the Headquarters Agreement within the Act itself. Id. at 1469-70. The court noted that
"[s]uch an inclusion would have left no doubt as to Congress' intent on a matter which had
been raised repeatedly with respect to this act, and its absence here reflects equivocation and
avoidance, leaving the court without clear interpretive guidance in the language of the Act."
Id. at 1468. For the court's discussion of congressional debate concerning the meaning of the
Act, see id. at 1469-71.
124. Id. at 1468 (citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 560-61 (1884) (Field,
J., dissenting)). The court used the "notwithstanding clause" in connection with the lack of an
unequivocal intent to -exclude the Mission from congressional regulation. Id.
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to examine any of the underlying motives that might have led to the
FMA or the decision to close the Information Office pursuant to it.
Although concluding that the Anti-Terrorism Act was inapplica-
ble to the United Nations observer mission, the district court at the
same time held that the statute is "a valid enactment of general appli-
cation."12 Furthermore, the district court stated that the statute is
"a wide gauged restriction of PLO activity within the United States
and, depending on the nature of its enforcement, could effectively cur-
tail any PLO activities in the United States aside from the mission to
the United Nations."'
126
2. MENDELSOHN v. MEESE
In Mendelsohn v. Meese,' numerous United States citizens and
organizations challenged the constitutionality of the Act.' 2' The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted standing to some 129 and held that the "listening" rights of the
others were amply addressed by those who had standing. 3 '
The Mendelsohn court was faced with two causes of action. The
first challenged the application of the Act to the United Nations-
related activities of the Deputy Permanent Observer to the Permanent
Observer Mission in New York.' The second challenged the appli-
cation of the Act to the curtailment or prohibition of debate, dialogue,
and the exchange of information between citizens of the United
States. 32 At issue was whether the Act, as applied, violated the first
amendment and the Bill of Attainder clause of the Constitution. 33
The three plaintiffs granted standing were all "speaking" plain-
tiffs-United States citizens who had alleged a commitment from the
PLO to pay for travel expenses to speak at colleges and other public
125. Id. at 1471.
126. Id.
127. 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
128. Id. at 1476-77. In Mendelsohn, a collection of sixty-five citizens and groups sued as
plaintiffs. Complaint, Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88- Civ.
2005 (ELP)). They included: law professors and academicians from Georgetown, Yale,
Princeton, Duke, Harvard, and Columbia; religious leaders, including a substantial number of
rabbis; prominent individuals, such as journalist Studs Terkel and television personality
Edward Asner; and a large contingent of public interest organizations, such as the Middle East
Peace Network, Jewish Committee for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace, International Jewish Peace
Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Id.
129. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1477-78.
130. Id. at 1479.
131. Id. at 1476.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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forums about the Middle East.134 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, a United
States citizen and Chairman of the Political Science Department at
Northwestern University, had been asked to speak at various loca-
tions throughout the United States and explain the political positions
of the PLO. a5 Nubar Hosvepian, also a United States citizen, sought
at the request of the PLO to open an office, with non-PLO private
funds, which would arrange speakers, forums, and distribute materi-
als on the subject of the Palestinian people. 136 Hosvepian had sworn
that "this office will not be authorized to present official views and
positons of the PLO, to speak on behalf of the PLO or to represent the
PLO." '137 Nonetheless, the court noted "[Hosvepian's] proposed
office comes within the literal prohibitions of the [Act]-he will estab-
lish it 'at the behest of' the PLO and with the purpose of 'furthering
the interests of' the PLO."13 The third plaintiff was Riyad H. Man-
sour, a United States citizen and Deputy Permanent Observer at the
PLO mission."3 9 The interests of these three plaintiffs, the court
wrote, were sufficient to establish "an intention to engage in a course
of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but pro-
scribed by a statute."'" The court refused standing to the sixty-two
other "listening" plaintiffs, ruling that their interest in dialogue and
debate with the "speaking" plaintiffs is an interest "common to all
United States citizens." '' The court recognized that, in some situa-
tions, "listening" plaintiffs may assert first amendment interests suffi-
cient for standing. 42 In this instance, however, the court reasoned
that the benefits which would accrue to the "listening" plaintiffs must
be considered in order to review the first amendment claims of the
"speaking" plaintiffs. 143 To the court, the issues raised by the "listen-
ing" plaintiffs were unnecessary, since they were the same as those
issues raised by the "speaking" plaintiffs.'" These plaintiffs had
claimed that their rights to freedom of speech, press, and association
had been denied through their inability to speak, listen to, and inter-
act with the "speaking" plaintiffs. 45 Thus, their claims were similar
134. Id. at 1476-77.
135. Id. at 1476.
136. Id. at 1477.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Babbit' v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1977)).
141. Id. at 1478.
142. Id. at 1479.
143. Id.
144. Id.,
145. Id. at 1478-79.
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to those made by Harvard Law School in Harvard Law School Forum
v. Shultz.
46
In Harvard, the Department of State had refused to grant the
PLO's Permanent Observer Zehdi Labib Terzi-a defendant in the
PLO case-a travel waiver which would permit him to appear at a
debate on the Middle East at Harvard University. 47  The State
Department acted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d), which allows
excludable aliens to be denied access to travel within the United
States. 148 The reason proffered by the State Department was precisely
the one forwarded in PLO: to deny the PLO the benefits of operating
within the United States. 4 9 In Harvard, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts found this to be a superficial
governmental interest, which disguised the true content-based sup-
pression of protected political discussion.
50
The district court in Mendelsohn first rejected the government's
argument that no first amendment interests were implicated by its
actions to close the PLO mission.' 5' The court found that the
exchange of ideas concerning political issues relating to the PLO was
necessarily less robust because of the Act.3 2 On its face, the Act per-
mits persons to speak however they wish regarding the PLO.' 53 The
court found, however, that citizens are prohibited from using PLO
146. 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated without opinion, 852 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.
1986).
147. Id. at 526.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 527.
150. Id. at 529-31.
151. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1479. The government argued that, on its face, the Act
did not prohibit, edit, or restrain speech or advocacy. Id. at 1479. See Meese v. Keene, 481
U.S. 465, 478 (1987) (Foreign Agents Registration Act, on its face, prohibits no speech or
advocacy). This is hardly the appropriate standard by which to judge a statute that alledgedly
restricts free speech. By prohibiting the disbursement of PLO funds to American citizens who
wish to promote Palestinian views peacefully, the Act denies an entire side, and only that side,
of a volatile political conflict from fully expressing its political positions. Israeli groups may,
by comparison, spend as much as desired to spread their own own political messages inside the
United States. See generally Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980) (The first amendment is hostile to content-based regulations which prohibit the public
discussion of an entire topic.).
152. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1479. For instance, two of the plaintiffs were American
professors who wished to travel within the United States to discuss the Palestinian problem
and who were denied the ability to receive reimbursement of their travel expenses from the
PLO for their efforts. Id. at 1486. The limitation on these professors' rights to solicit and
expend funds require a first amendment analysis, which the court provided-albeit an
imperfect one. Id. at 1479-86. See Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1889-95 (1988) (First
amendment rights are implicated when the government obstructs the right to solicit and
expend funds for the payment of petition circulators.).
153. For the text of the Act, see supra text accompanying note 36.
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funds to travel and make their views known, as well as prohibited
from establishing an office at the request of the PLO.154 The district
court further held that the PLO lies outside the structure of the con-
stitutional system and is therefore not entitled to any rights that the
Constitution confers."' In addition, the district court concluded that
American citizens may not invoke the PLO's rights because to do so
would severely intrude on the ability of the political branches to con-
duct foreign affairs. 156 The court reasoned that this would ensnare
the judiciary in virtually all foreign policy actions that the United
States might take, and bring before the courts a myriad number of
cases with which the courts are unprepared and by their nature not
designed to resolve.1 5 7 Thus American citizens who act as official rep-
154. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1480.
155. Id. at 1480-81. This linchpin of the Mendelsohn court's first amendment analysis is
questionable. In fact, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of what
rights, if any, the Constitution confers upon foreign states. See Damrosch, Foreign States and
the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 490, 518 (1987); see also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972) (discussing the application of the Constitution to foreign
affairs). Although the state of law in this area is complex and not completely settled, the
courts appear to distinguish between foreign states per se and American citizens or aliens who
represent foreign states in the United States. Damrosch, supra, at 527-28 & n.180. As the
Mendelsohn court mentioned, there are strong policy reasons for maintaining such a
distinction, though not necessarily when the rights of American citizens are also involved.
Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1481.
156. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1490.
157. Courts are thought to be better suited to the disposition of questions of law rather than
policy. The conduct of foreign affairs is considered an archetypical example of policymaking,
not susceptible to the application of antecedent legal principles. See generally L. HENKIN,
supra note 92 (arguing that questions in the foreign relations arena are inherently political).
The distinction between law and policy has been under continual attack since the early
1900's as a transparent notion which disguises the policymaking function of the courts. In the
late 1920's, the movement known as Legal Realism first developed its critique of the classical
view of the law as the simple application of objective, logical rules. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 42 (1936); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1923); Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). Legal
realists concentrated on the need to provide factual proof and empirical data as a substitute for
abstract legal verbalisms, which, in the realist's view, only serve as a pretext for decisions
actually motivated by subjective forces. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973)
(arguing that legal realists' rejection of a static, rational-absolutist notion of law as an ideal
tracked the concurrent rejection of an absolute reality in science, math, art, and the
humanities); Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the
New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987) (sketching out developments in Legal Realism
and Critical Legal Studies as reflective of historical changes in epistemology).
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) attempts to follow the critique made by Legal Realists on the
law/policy distinction, but picks up the analysis after the extensive discouragement with the
ability of "the facts" to provide a determinative and useful explanation of the law. Williams,
supra, at 444. For an example of "realist" discouragement, see R.M. HUTCHINS, No
FRIENDLY VOICE 43-48 (1936). CLS has forcefully challenged the notion that the law is
anything but policy. See, e.g., Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
743 (1987); Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981);
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resentatives of the PLO cannot invoke the Constitution to assert
claims on behalf of the PLO.
158
Although the district court easily disposed of the Deputy Perma-
nent Observer's claim as a representative of the PLO, there still
remained the claims of the three "speaking" plaintiffs who denied that
they were acting in any official capacity for the PLO.'59 The district
court explicitly refused to cross the line between an official representa-
tive of the PLO and those "agents," who are "dominated" or "con-
trolled" by the PLO."6 Instead, by maintaining this distinction, the
district court was able to preserve their constitutional claims. This is
in direct contradiction to the analysis employed by the court in Pales-
tine Information Office.
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Towards a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4
INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981).
158. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp.. at 1481.
159. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
160. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1481 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 95-96 (1961)). The usage of terms such as "dominated" and
"controlled" in reference to associations with or representations of foreign entities is
reminiscent of language used during the "Red Scare" which engulfed the nation during the late
1940's and 1950's. Consider, for example, this finding of fact from the Emergency Detention
Act of 1950:
The organizations so established and utilized in various countries, [by the
Communist dictatorship], acting under such control, direction, and discipline,
endeavor to carry out the objectives of the world Communist movement by
bringing about the overthrow of existing governments and setting up Communist
totalitarian dictatorships which will be subservient to the most powerful existing
Communist totalitarian dictatorship. Although such Communist organizations
usually designate themselves as political parties, they are in fact constituent
elements of the world-wide movement and promote the objectives of such
movement by conspiratorial and coercive tactics, and especially by the use of
espionage and sabotage, instead of through the democratic processes of a free
elective system or through the freedom-preserving means employed by a political
party which operates as an agency by which people govern themselves.
Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, title II, § 101(6), 64 Stat. 1019-20.
It is often the case that enemies of the state are alleged to be so powerful that they "con-
trol," "dominate," or "order"' their followers. Thus followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini or
Muammar Kadhafi are "fanatics" who are crazy and have lost all hold of reality. Similar
constructs and rhetoric prevailed in respect to the American Indians and their tribal leaders
during settlement of the West in the 1800's, the Japanese and Emperor Hirohito during World
War II, and drug users and the substances they abuse today. The subtext in such categoriza-
tions is that no rational and free thinker could ever conclude that these groups or activities
were worthwhile in themselves, and allegiance to them must necessarily be the result of mind
control or some extra-rational, perhaps primitive or charismatic attraction. For a recent
example, consider the media portrayal of supporters of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who are
continually presented as overly passionate, frenzied, and enthusiastic to the point of mania.
See, e.g., Taking Jackson Seriously, TIME, Apr. 11, 1988, at 14 (The Jackson campaign
unleashed "primordial Democratic passions."). See generally E. HERMAN & N. CHOMSKY,
MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988); M.
PARENTI, supra note 43; J. SKOLNICK, supra note 1, at 332-34.
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The district court utilized the distinction in first amendment
jurisprudence between content-based restrictions on political speech
and incidental restrictions on speech not aimed at the particular con-
tent or subject. 61 Content-based restrictions are subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny, while incidental restrictions are subject to more
deferential review.' 62 The court refused to find that the Act consti-
tuted a content-based restriction on free speech.1 63 Instead, the dis-
trict court held that the Act is merely an incidental restriction on
speech and therefore properly reviewed under the deferential test
enunciated in O'Brien."' The legitimate governmental interest pro-
moted by the Act, the district court reasoned, is the tactical and stra-
tegic advantage gained over the PLO by denying them the benefits of
operating in the United States. 65 The court stressed that this is a
substantial and important governmental interest, unrelated to the sup-
pression of speech.' 66 The court refused to consider other possible
motivations for the Act, stating that when Congress has exercised a
legitimate power, examination of the alleged ulterior speech-sup-
pressing motives becomes immaterial. 67 The incidental effect on the
suppression of free speech, while "arguably lamentable,"' 68 was none-
theless permissible. Moreover, the court concluded that the prohibi-
tions related to the spending and receiving of the PLO's money were
needed to effectuate Congress' objective of denying the PLO benefits
from operation inside the United States. 69 Consequently, citizens
161. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1482.
162. Id.
163. Id. A content-based restriction on speech is one that seeks to restrict a particular
message or the substantive content of speech. This is distinguished from restrictions that are
not related to the content of the speech, but which merely have the incidental effect of
restricting information. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at §§ 12-2 through 12-18, at 789-944.
Content-based restrictions are subject to strict judicial review,, while restrictions related to
matters other than content receive a more deferential inquiry. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct.
1157, 1164 (1988) (content based restrictions are "subjected to the most exacting scrutiny").
Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (strict scrutiny for content-
based regulations) with United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973) (lower level of scrutiny for content-neutral regulations). For an analysis
of this distinction as it applies to the Act, see infra Section IV(B)(1).
164. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1482 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)).
165. Id. at 1485. Under the O'Brien test, Congress' actual purpose in enacting the statute is
irrelevant to whether the statute is constitutional, so long as a legitimate governmental interest
exists. Id. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382-85. This is so regardless of whether Congress actually
relied on the governmental interest asserted. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. at 556-57; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
166. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
167. Id. at 1485.
168. Id. at 1485-86.
169. Id. at 1486.
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who wish to speak about the Middle East and obtain reimbursement
for their travel expenses from the PLO may not be permitted to do
SO.17
0
With respect to Nubar Hovsepian, the American citizen who
wished to set up an information office, the district court concluded
that the Act must be read very narrowly.1 7' Because Hovsepian had
stated that he would in no way be acting as an official of the PLO, the
district court reasoned that if the Act were to shut the proposed office
down, it would be curtailing his operations in the United States, not
the PLO's. 172 The district court was concerned over a broad interpre-
tation of certain ambiguous language in the Act that states one must
be acting at the "behest" or "direction" of the PLO to fall under the
statute's provisions.173 Concluding that only official representatives of
the PLO are barred from asserting the protections of the Constitu-
tion, 74 the district court recognized that if the Act was read too
broadly, it would severely restrict first amendment interests.
175
Instead, the court chose to read the Act narrowly.176 Only Mansour's
first amendment claims were barred, given that he was the only plain-
tiff to act as an official of the PLO.177 The district court cited remarks
of congressional supporters of the Act who distinguished between
contact with the PLO and a "principal agency relationship between
the PLO and American citizens."' 78 Absent clear congressional
intent to subject all American citizens who speak with the PLO to the
Act, the district court concluded that the Act must be narrowly con-
170. It is possible, of course, that Congress was genuinely concerned that money, ostensibly
provided by the PLO for reimbursement purposes, might actually be used to sponsor terrorist
activities within the United States. Although this may well have been a legitimate
congressional fear, it was never expressed during floor debate, nor was it addressed by the
parties or amici in Mendelsohn.
171. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1486.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1481.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting from 133 CONG. REC. S13,854 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (remarks of
Senator Grassley)). By determining congressional intent, the court thus engaged in precisely
the kind of inquiry that it expressly refused to engage in when examining whether the Act was
content-neutral. This selective examination is representative of the theoretical muddle in
which the court was mired as it sought to uphold the Act while downplaying the motivations
that led to its enactment.
The court bolstered this narrow reading of the Act by mentioning its specific exemption
for informational materials. Id. at 1486. If the PLO may not spend money to distribute these
materials, however, then this exception is of little practical importance. Once an effective
method of distribution is established, as in Palestine Information Office, it will be closed under
the FMA.
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strued to allay the problematic limitations on speech that would
otherwise ensue. 79
The district court addressed the argument by the plaintiffs that
the Act is a Bill of Attainder by first reviewing the history of Bill of
Attainders in the colonial era.' 8 ° The district court found that the
Act would be a classic Bill of Attainder but for the fact that the PLO,
according to the court, stands outside of the Constitution. 18  The dis-
trict court again read the Act restrictively as a curb on the PLO itself,
and not on the PLO's mission and the mission's personnel.182 By so
doing, the district court held that the Act is not a Bill of Attainder
subject to constitutional restraints.8 3
The district court's narrow reading of the Act to preserve its con-
stitutionality stands in stark contrast to the D.C. Circuit's broad
interpretation of the FMA in Palestine Information Office. Examin-
ing the constitutional issues raised by the Act and the apparent incon-
sistencies between the analysis in PLO and Mendelsohn and the
analysis in Palestine Information Office will reveal the depth of the
constitutional concerns involved.
179. Id. at 1486. For support, the court cited Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988), in which the Supreme
Court stated that in construing statutes, a reasonable construction is preferred to one which
would be unconstitutional, unless that construction would be plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress. Id. at 1397.
180. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1487-88.
181. Id. at 1488-89.
182. Id. This indicated to the court that the Act was an exercise of the foreign affairs
powers of the executive, rather than the legislative powers of Congress which are the
appropriate focus of prohibitions on Bills of Attainder. Yet the prohibition on Bills of
Attainder is designed to effectuate all of the separation of powers doctrine, and an intrusion of
the executive on the judiciary is just as violative of separation of powers as is an intrusion by
the legislature.
Moreover, there are Supreme Court decisions that support a theory that the Executive is
also restricted from acting in a manner similar to a Bill of Attainder. See, e.g., Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (plurality). In McGrath, the
Attorney General, acting pursuant to an executive order and without notice or hearing,
designated three organizations as Communist for use in a Loyalty Review Board hearing. Id.
at 125 (opinion of Burton, J.). The Board hearings were conducted by the government to
identify disloyal government employees. Id. The Supreme Court, unable to agree on an
opinion, nonetheless found that the organizations had standing to assert that they were not, in
fact, Communist. Id. at 140-42. In his concurrence, Justice Black said that, although the
classic Bill of Attainder was a condemnation by the legislature upon its own investigation, he
could not "believe that the authors of the Constitution, who outlawed the bill of attainder,
inadvertently endowed the executive with power to engage in the same tyrannical practices
that had made the bill such an odious institution." Id. at 144 (Black, J., concurring).
The Mendelsohn court's reasoning is particularly unpersuasive when one recognizes that
the Act is an act of Congress, implemented-as are all statutes-by the Executive. The
reasoning is more appropriate, although equally unconvincing, when applied to the Palestine
Information Office case, in which executive power is at issue.
183. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1489.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
A. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers doctrine, by disbursing governmental
power among different branches, can be defined as an attempt to pro-
hibit the accumulation of governmental power by any single person or
group of persons. In the federal system, powers are divided among
the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.'84 Several of the
arguments over the Anti-Terrorism Act and the separation of powers
doctrine presented in this Section of the Comment are contradictory
and mutually exclusive. They are raised to demonstrate that, no mat-
ter how one conceives of the role and functions of the individual
branches of government, the Act is likely nonetheless to threaten or
encroach upon one of these conceptions.
1. CONGRESSIONAL INTRUSION ON EXECUTIVE POWERS
Ever since United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"' the
courts have recognized that the President has a unique and special
role in foreign affairs.18 6 The Act threatens this special role by limit-
ing those foreign governments with whom the President may main-
tain contact and conduct diplomatic relations. For instance, the Act
would prevent the President from inviting the PLO to open a diplo-
matic consulate within the United States. President Reagan noted
this constitutional infirmity but signed the Act anyway, deciding there
was no conflict at that time between the Executive and Congress on
establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO.18 ' Yet the dynamics
of unrest in the Middle East may one day result in subsequent Presi-
184. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
185. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
186. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court recognized the Executive's role as the primary figure in
the nation's foreign affairs. Id. at 319. The Court also concluded that participation by the
other branches in the conduct of foreign relations is "significantly limited ... [because in] this
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." Id.
187. Statement by President Reagan upon signing H.R. 1777, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1547-48 (Dec. 28, 1987). Because the Act was part of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, President Reagan would have had to veto the entire bill in order to veto
the Act. Faced with this dilemma, he demurred: "I am signing the Act, therefore, only
because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a
consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision." Id. at 48.
Such a statement, however, misunderstands the separation of powers doctrine, which cannot
be violated simply with the empowered branch's consent. See Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the legislative veto provisions of the
Immigration Act unconstitutional despite presidential acquiescence). Without such a
limitation on delegation, accumulation of power by one branch could be achieved simply
through political compromise, negotiation, or even intimidation.
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dents considering actions that President Reagan did not. The recent
decision by the United States to establish "contact" with the PLO
demonstrates the changing character of Middle East diplomacy and
highlights the potential obstruction by the Act of traditional executive
functions.' The necessity of maintaining a flexible response and the
need to explore all options in the Middle East places the Act at odds
with the quick and decisive exercise of executive power. The explicit
constitutional grant to receive ambassadors,8 9 as well as all the pow-
ers attached to the President when acting in the realm of foreign
affairs, is inhibited by restricting the President's choices in the foreign
arena. 19
0
Although it is clear that Congress has power to regulate foreign
affairs, the source and scope of that power remains unclear.' 91 Many
of the most significant cases to test the extent of executive power in
the realm of foreign affairs resulted from a potential delegation prob-
188. Some have argued that Congress should assume only a general role in the conduct of
foreign policy, in part because Congress can be overly responsive to public pressure and
opinion. See Moore, Do We Have an Imperial Congress? 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 149
(1988). One commentator has remarked:
In my opinion, Congress oversteps its role when it undertakes to dictate the
specific terms of international relations. This is a power granted specifically to
the executive branch, which is equipped to acquire the information necessary for
foreign policy creation .... In other words, Congress ignores its role as a check
on the President and assumes a leadership role akin to negotiating a treaty-an
activity clearly forbidden to Congress-when it dictates specific conditions for
relations between foreign entities.
Cooper, Hatch, Rostow, Tigar, What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 165, 202-03 (1988) (remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), made during a sympo-
sium on the meaning of executive power). Senator Hatch used these arguments to question the
wisdom of the so-called Boland Amendments, which placed various restrictions on govern-
mental aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. Id. An outspoken and virulent opponent of the
Boland Amendment restrictions, Senator Hatch apparently did not extend this reasoning to
the Anti-Terrorism Act, as he voted for its passage. 133 CONG. REC. S13,875 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1987). It is possible, however, that he was simply faced with the same dilemma facing Presi-
dent Reagan: to vote down the Act would have meant voting down the entire Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act. See supra note 187.
189. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
190. While the President's power in the realm of foreign affairs is extensive and far-
reaching, it is not boundless. When the foreign affairs power is invoked in the domestic
setting, the President's authority is significantly more constrained. See supra note 81.
191. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). The Supreme Court, in sustaining a
statutory provision on loss of citizenship, stated: "Although there is in the Constitution no
specific power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no
doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation." Id. at 57. See
also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (Congress has broad power,
under Necessary and Proper clause, to enact legislation in the foreign affairs arena.). This,
however, should not affect the exclusive presidential power to recognize foreign governments.
See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
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lem between Congress and the Executive. 192 The Act, however,
involves a restriction on executive power that cannot be said to derive
from a delegation by Congress, and instead has its source in the Con-
stitution.193 Although no case has yet struck down federal legislation
as encroaching on the executive's authority to conduct foreign
affairs,194 there is no principled way to distinguish the separation of
powers concerns raised by such legislation from other, more frequent
separation of powers litigation. 95 No court is willing to define and
divide the shared powers of Congress and the President in the foreign
affairs arena; however, no court in this instance need to: the power to
determine the recognition policies of the United States-at least in its
traditional, uncontroverted form-has generally been acknowledged
to reside in the Executive, and that power is properly immune from
congressional interference. 9 6 Thus, the Act impermissibly prevents
192. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (Congress authorized presidential
restrictions on travel to Cuba); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (holding that limits on the delegation of powers are less restrictive in the foreign affairs
context than in the domestic arena). But see Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976) (permitting broad delegation of authority to President with respect to oil
imports).
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Presidential duties include, among others, to "receive
Ambassadors and other public ministers.").
194. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1483.
195. In fact, many recent acts of legislation are claimed to encroach on executive power in
the realm of foreign affairs. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
196. Courts have been reluctant to define the exact limits of the President's recognition
power, avoiding the issue based on grounds of justiciability, standing, or the political question
doctrine. An example of this reluctance is found in a case arising from President Carter's
termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as part of his administration's recognition
of the mainland government of China. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). As a result
of the treaty termination, several Senators filed an action claiming that the Senate's
constitutional role in the making of treaties had been abridged. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d
697, 700-01, vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Reaching
the merits of the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the President had the power to terminate treaties without the approval of Congress. Id. at
709. The Supreme Court summarily reversed. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
In a concurring opinion-in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Stevens
joined-Justice Rehnquist wrote:
I am of the opinion that the basic question presented by the petitioners in this
case is "political" and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of
the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to
which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President.
Id. at 1002.
Dissenting from the summary reversal, Justice Brennan wrote:
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political question," Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, in my view, profoundly misapprehends the political-question princi-
ple as it applies to matters of foreign relations. Properly understood, the polit-
ical-question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign
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the President from carrying out his constitutionally assigned duties. 197
2. CONGRESSIONAL INTRUSION ON THE JUDICIARY
As the Mendelsohn court stated, the Act would constitute a clas-
sic Bill of Attainder but for the fact that the PLO stands outside the
protection of the Constitution. 98 A recognized purpose of the consti-
tutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder is to maintain the separate
powers of the federal government. 99 An enactment that singles out
for punishment a particular person or group of persons usurps and
degrades the judicial role in a scheme of separation of powers .20 This
concern is not mitigated by the court's constitutional positioning of
the PLO, since the court's role in either instance merely would be to
lend its authority to the Attorney General's "identification of defend-
ants already prejudged and penalized by the statute." 20' The process
by which individuals are subjected to punishment is inherently judi-
cial, and Bills of Attainder act as little more than trial by legislature,
without the attendant safeguards of a judicial proceeding.
20 2
policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been "constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." But the doctrine does
not pertain when a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particu-
lar branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of political deci-
sionmAking power. The issue of decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a
matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within
the competence of the courts.
Id. at 1006-07 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Reaching the merits of the case,
Justice Brennan concluded that the "Constitution commits to the President alone the power to
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes," and that the abrogation of the
treaty "was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government." Id. at
1007.
197. Justice Jackson enunciated a less expansive interpretation of the President's power in
foreign affairs in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (the Steel Seizure case). Employing his now-familiar designation of the three
categories in which the President's power may fluctuate, in recognizing the PLO, the
Executive would be acting against the express will of Congress--as embodied in the Anti-
Terrorism Act-and therefore in the category where his power would be at its lowest ebb.
This analysis is undercut, however, when there is a specific grant of power to the President by
the Constitution such as the power to receive ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In
response, it could be argued that representatives of the PLO are not ambassadors in the strict
sense since they do not represent any single geographic area or internationally recognized
government.
198. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1488-89.
199. Id. at 1488.
200. "[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical . . .
prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature."
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1964); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
201. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1489.
202. This "trial by legislature" is antithetical to the Supreme Court's recent trend of
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Because the legislature is more susceptible to public clamor and
interest-group pressure than the judiciary, the separation of powers
function of a Bill of Attainder is crucial when the group singled out is
politically unpopular. The political unpopularity of the group, cou-
pled with congressional desire to enact popular legislation, prevents
the legislative body from impartially weighing the evidence, and the
procedural safeguards that operate in judicial proceedings are endan-
gered or lost. When groups selected by the legislature for special bur-
dens are relatively small and politically unpopular, it is easier for the
legislature to act against them than if a broad spectrum of interest
groups are affected. These smaller groups serve as effective scape-
goats for the frustrations of a majority, particularly if the groups are
marginal and expendable to the economy.2 °3 Action taken against
"scapegoat" groups permit the level of esteem of congressmen to rise
in the eyes of the majority at the expense of a politically powerless
minority.
The "findings" of the Act constitute a shorthand way of substi-
tuting membership in a political organization for the undesirable
characteristics of some of its members, which are properly the subject
of congressional action. As the Court wrote forcefully in United
adopting the view of an inflexible, strictly separated division of power among the branches. In
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court adopted a
formalist interpretation of separation of powers, holding that action legislative in character
must meet the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure" of Article I. Id.
at 951. The Court, by making an initial determination as to which of the three branches the
action in question belongs, thus decides whether the separation of powers doctrine has been
violated. The Act, as the Mendelsohn court noted, inflicts "punishment upon the PLO, its
members and affiliates with only a pro forma judicial inquiry .... Congress has left almost
nothing for the federal courts to do but lend their authority to the injunction sought by the
Attorney General." Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1454-55. Regardless of whether the court
believes the PLO is outside the protection of the Constitution, the Act could not survive this
formal approach. The "escape" of one branch from the confines of its formal prison has the
same constitutional ramifications, regardless of the extra-constitutional reason for its flight.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-54 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Northern Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Justice Powell, in Chadha, argued that Congress' action not only affronts the Constitution's
"general allocation of power, but also ... the Bill of Attainder Clause," which represents "the
Framers' concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse
of power." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962.
203. This rationale has been offered to explain why, during World War II, Japanese-
Americans living on the west coast were placed in detention camps while Japanese-Americans
living in Hawaii were not. The argument is that those who lived on the west coast were
relatively few and unnecessary to the economy, while those who lived in Hawaii were
numerous and essential to the economic well-being of the region. See G..PERRETT, DAYS OF
SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMPH 233 (1973). A similar argument posits that McCarthyism
destructed in part because it appeared to threaten the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Id. at
399-401; see also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 570-72.
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States v. Brown :2 "In a number of decisions, this Court has pointed
out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the Communist
Party, or any other political organization, can be regarded as an alter-
native, but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteris-
tics."2 °5 By punishing those who wish to exercise their rights of free
speech and association via the promotion of views shared by the PLO,
Congress has obtruded the judicial process of determining which
members or associates of the PLO actually exhibit terrorist behavior.
3. JUDICIAL INTRUSION ON THE POLITICAL
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
In Palestine Information Office, both the district court and the
D.C. Circuit expressed reluctance to examine executive decisions in
the realm of foreign affairs.20 6 Nevertheless, the courts were forced to
examine the propriety of the State Department's actions due to the
clear first amendment interests involved. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in both PLO and Mendelsohn, also
expressed its unwillingness to invade the traditional foreign affairs
power of the Executive. Nonetheless, it found itself entrenched in
questions better left to the political branches.2"7
204. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
205. Id. at 455.
206. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 674 F. Supp. 910, 916 (D.D.C. 1988); Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Palestine Information
Office, the D.C. Circuit noted that the Executive acted pursuant to explicit congressional
authorization, and thus its actions were "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation." Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 937
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637.(1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (the Steel Seizure case). This, however, states the conclusion while bypassing the
inquiry. The precise question before the court is whether the Executive exceeded its statutory
authority, and whether the action of closing an information office located in the United States
actually is an appropriate exercise of the foreign affairs power. That the court so willingly
concedes both indicates an extreme deference to the Executive. President Truman based his
actions in the Steel Seizure case on a claim of power similar to that asserted in Palestine
Information Office, arguing that the seizure of domestic steel mills was an appropriate action
under the general powers of the Executive. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. The Court made a
searching inquiry, questioning and ultimately rejecting the claim. Id. at 585-89. Absent
coordinated congressional action or a state of national emergency, the Court refused to rest on
the traditional deference accorded the Executive when in the realm of foreign affairs. Id. at
587; see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State was
without congressional authority to deny passports to members of the Communist Party). But
see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (Court finds congressional authorization for the
Reagan administration's ban on travel to Cuba).
207. The political question doctrine has been justified as a recognition that certain disputes
lie outside the law's ability to formulate antecedent principles which are appropriate for
judicial application. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208-16 (1972).
In PLO, the court was asked to decide the sensitive question of whether the United States
should submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. This question, however,
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The judiciary is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of
complex international political disputes, especially when the conflicts
revolve around the precise body designed to resolve such disputes:
the United Nations. By deciding the international obligations of the
Unites States, the judiciary reluctantly interprets an ambiguous stat-
ute, while the lawmakers remain unaccountable for the result.2 °s
Although this may be the purpose behind much vague legislation, it
produces the effect of removing from the public its democratic control
over the actions of elected officials. The judiciary is left to take the
blame for whatever the Act is ultimately interpreted to mean, while
Congress safely escapes any resulting political fallout.
Several of the criteria for a nonjusticiable political question, as
established by Baker v. Carr,2°  also appear applicable to the Act.
The decision regarding whether the United States should submit to
international arbitration, for example, appears to involve "an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
'210
Furthermore, the involvement of the judiciary in a possible dispute
between the Executive and Congress over the appropriate relationship
of the United States towards the PLO raises the "potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question. ' 211 The Act thus blurs the traditional distinc-
tions between the various branches of government, and creates a
liberating effect on the normal boundaries of the Executive, Congress,
and the judiciary. As Professor Nowak has stated:
Federalism and the separation of powers issues, at least when they
relate to foreign affairs, should be considered political questions
because the interaction of the President and Congress gives our
country needed flexibility in foreign affairs and allows us to arrive
is one whose resolution is controlled more by the realities of international politics than the
dictates of international law. The continued viability of the United States as the "host"
country for the United Nations is similarly a product of global politics. Cf Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964) (concluding in the "act of state" context that "[i]t
is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which
touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the
community of nations"). But cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance").
208. By remaining vague as to the exact meaning and intended scope of a statute,
congressmen can later disclaim politically unpopular constructions given to that statute by the
courts. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
209. 369 U.S.' 186 (1962).
210. Id. at 217; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 11, comment h (1986) (Action relating to treaties that are not self-
executing should only be taken by the executive or legislative branches.).
211. Baker, 369 U.S. at 1860.
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at practical accomodations that best serve our national interests.
There is no indication in the text of the Constitution or its amend-
ments that the judiciary is authorized to create a fixed, "legal"
delineation of the roles of the President and Congress in foreign
affairs.2 12
B. The First Amendment
1. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The recent court decisions concerning the Act reveal two con-
flicting approaches to the first amendment rights involved. The first
approach consists of a minimal inquiry into whether any first amend-
ment freedoms have been abridged. 21a The second approach, on the
other hand, displays a more sensitive and searching inquiry into the
Act's potential for first amendment infringement.214 These contradic-
tory approaches become evident when one compares the Palestine
Information Office and Mendelsohn cases, and ultimately produce an
uncomfortable catch-22 that would likely ensnare American citizens
who hope effectively to espouse opposition views concerning the Mid-
dle East.
Mendelsohn reveals the court's awareness that strong first
amendment rights are involved. This is evidenced by the court's dis-
tinction between American citizens who are official representatives of
the PLO and all other American citizens. While the court held that
an American citizen acting as an official representative of the PLO
cannot invoke the Constitution to protect his speech, 15 the court
treated the three "speaking" plaintiffs as American citizens who are
entitled to all the protections of the Constitution. The court simply
refused to recognize the government's assertions that an American
citizen is "dominated," "controlled," or an agent of a foreign power
persuasive to dislodge the first amendment right that the particular
citizen possesses.2 16
212. Koh, Nowak, Rees & Sofaer, The Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 120 (1988).
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) is a recent example of a court's refusal to
delineate the precise foreign affair powers of Congress and the Executive. In Lowry, 110
members of Congress sought a court declaration that would require the President, in
accordance with the War Powers Resolution, to submit a report concerning the use of Armed
Forces in the Persian Gulf. Id. at 334. The plaintiffs argued that the reporting requirements of
the War Powers Resolution had been triggered by United States naval escort operations and an
attack on an Iranian Navy ship laying mines in the Gulf. Id. The court refused jurisdiction
under the political question doctrine and the constraints of equitable discretion. Id. at 341.
213. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 939-42 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
214. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1479-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
215. Id. at 1480.
216. Id. at 1481.
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By contrast, the court in Palestine Information Office was willing
to determine that political advocacy on behalf of a foreign principal is
sufficient to trigger the FMA, regardless of the official status of that
citizen or group.21 7 By designating the Information Office a foreign
mission, the State Department was able to restrict the constitutional
rights that the Information Office and its staff would otherwise enjoy.
This form of decision by designation is inappropriate in constitutional
jurisprudence." 8 Palestine Information Office thus "crossed the line"
that Mendelsohn refused to, and as a result an office that promotes
views shared by the PLO can escape prosecution under the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act but become susceptible to closure under the FMA.2"9
This creates a "chilling effect" on political advocacy which is undesir-
able in a democratic state that treasures a free market place of
ideas.220
The D.C. Circuit in Palestine Information Office, having found
no content-based restriction on free speech, interpreted the FMA
under the O'Brien test for incidental restrictions on first amendment
freedoms.22 The court refused to apply the stringent scrutiny
required of a content-based restriction on political speech, stating that
the FMA, on its face, does not single out for punishment advocacy of
the PLO's doctrines.222 Yet it is not to be expected that the govern-
ment would openly declare the content-based nature of the statutory
restrictions. Indeed, it is not unusual for the government to assert an
interest unrelated to the restriction on speech. 223 The duty of a court,
217. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
218. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (resolution of constitutional controversies
is more than "semantic cataloguing").
219. Because the FMA is applied to all foreign missions, its potential for oppressive
application is even greater than that under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Every information office
claimed by the executive department to represent a foreign principal is now subject to closure,
as well as every domestic organization which hopes to advocate views shared by foreign
principals.
220. A major function of the first amendment 'is to facilitate the free discussion of
governmental and public affairs. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 838-39 (1978); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1976). A free trade in ideas permits all points of view to
have the opportunity for expression, producing a better informed and more capable citizenry,
and ultimately a more accountable government. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971) (Free expression preserves the individual dignity and choice upon which the political
system rests.).
221. See supra note 86-95 and accompanying text.
222. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988). On
occasions, the Supreme Court has applied somewhat stricter scrutiny to content-neutral
regulations. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal election spending
limitations, despite application to all candidates); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)
(overturning state law that prohibited election-day campaigning despite apparent neutrality).
223. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY'AND DISTRUST 128-29 (1980). Ely notes that only in very
[Vol. 43:667
ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987
if the alternative to an examination of motive is an automatic finding
of constitutionality, is to pierce the guise of neutrality and closely
scrutinize the government's asserted noncontent-related justifica-
tions.224 The district court in Mendelsohn refused to do so beyond
accepting the government's claim that the purpose of the Act is to
deny the PLO the benefits of operating in the United States. This was
done despite numerous assertions on the floor of Congress that the
Anti-Terrorism Act is designed to do far more than that.225
In Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,226 the Supreme
Court stated that "above-all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' 227 By making it
unlawful to receive or expend any PLO funds, the Anti-Terrorism
Act limits the free expression of those who require outside funding to
rare circumstances will the government openly assert the content-based nature of a regulation.
Id. at 231-32.
224. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976). The difficulties in
determining the correct motivation for a legislative body's actions have been discussed at great
length elsewhere. See Bork, supra note 32; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J 1205, 1212-23 (1970); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because
of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 105
(1978). Professor Tribe contends that the relevant inquiry is whether the legislature was
substantially motivated by an improper purpose. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 12-6, at 825
(1988). But this reduces the content distinction to a mere formality. See M. REDISH
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 107-08 (1984). The best way to avoid indirect but actual
suppression of information is to closely scrutinize all content-neutral regulations. This would
better focus the inquiry to an examination of the compelling interest as alleged by the
government and avoid the inherent problems of apprehending legislative intent. See id. at 125.
This approach still suffers from the problems inherent in any ad hoc balancing test, but it more
fully serves the values of free expression. For an explicit example of motive review in free
speech jurisprudence, see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (state tax
on newspapers invalid because real purpose was to restrict speech).
225. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. E2249 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Gallegly).
Rep. Gallegly vehemently argued that "it is ludicrous to allow the PLO free reign to spread
their ideology of hate and violence" and asserted that the Act would help to prevent United
States citizens from terrorist attack. Id. Further, he stated that the Act would close both the
PLO Observer Mission in New York as well as the Palestine Information Office in
Washington, D.C. Ironically, the Information Office was closed under the Foreign Missions
Act and the Act was held inapplicable to the Observer Mission. See also 133 CONG. REC.
H4047 (daily ed. May 28, 1987) (statement of Rep. Herger) (discussing need to stop the
distribution of PLO propaganda in the United States); 133 CONG. REC. S12,854 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("I think we ought to think twice before extending the
first amendment right to foreign entities using our soil.., to carry out acts of terrorism or even
preach that.")
226. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
227. Id. at 95; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (Major purpose of first
amendment is to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.). Unpopular political
speech is often disturbing or offensive to those who are exposed to it, but it must be accepted as
a given that first amendment analysis should not turn on how offensive or disturbing a court or
legislature finds the particular political expression to be. M. REDISH, supra note 224, at 60.
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carry on their educational efforts.228 This ultimately dilutes all of our
rights, as ideas not fully explained can never be fully judged. The free
discussion of governmental affairs should be no less protected because
the listeners' and debaters' first amendment rights are asserted.229
While the Act permits the receipt of informational material from the
PLO, the best "informational material" is often the vigorous face-to-
face debate of an important political issue by conflicting and differing
voices.23  As the Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Opelika,231 "[t]o
proscribe the dissemination of doctrines or arguments which do not
transgress military or moral limits is to destroy the principal bases of
democracy-knowledge and discussion. "232 Senator Jesse Helms,
who filed a vigorous amicus brief strongly supporting the closure of
the Palestine Information Office, ironically may have said it best when
he opposed the government's effort to close the Rhodesian Informa-
tion Office in 1977:
[I]t is the American people who will be the losers, not the Rhode-
sians. It will be the American people who will lack the full and
free debate that is guaranteed by the Constitution. It will be the
American people who will have denied to them information that is
228. Such a restriction would appear to contradict the Supreme Court's most recent cases
that define the extent and limits of legislative power to regulate the financing of political
campaigns. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-83 (1978) (extending
to corporations the first amendment right to expend funds in advocacy of political causes);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (holding unconstitutional the expenditure
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). These cases support a broad
individual, associational right to spend large sums of money in the pursuit of political ends. A.
Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 68 (1981). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
113 (1943) (state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of first amendment guarantees).
229. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972).
230. The "marketplace of ideas" theory was originally derived from the writings of John
Stuart Mill. See J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 21-71 (J. Robson ed.
1966); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Mill posited that the free competition among ideas strengthens truth and exposes falsity, and
that a vigilant struggle to defend one's convictions guards against both falsehood and
fanaticism. J.S. MILL, supra, at 60. But see R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 193
(1968) (free society is itself a social value). The "marketplace of ideas" concept, when used to
defend free speech, has been severely attacked. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 276-77 (1977); M. REDISH, supra note 224, at 46; Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964, 974-81 (1978). This is because it
appears to suffer from internal contradiction: truth is its ultimate goal, yet truth can never be
fully attained. M. REDISH, supra note 224, at 46; see also I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 187 (1977). The marketplace must exist forever because no single, definitive truth
can ever emerge. The attainment of truth, however, cannot be the only value that free speech
serves; if so, arguments that are patently false would deserve no free speech protection. See M.
REDISH, supra note 224, at 47.
231. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
232. Id. at 594.
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rightfully theirs.23a
The Mendelsohn court read the Act's prohibition on the estab-
lishment of offices at the behest, direction, or with funds provided by
the PLO narrowly, recognizing the serious first amendment problems
that otherwise might have resulted.234 Yet the court in Palestine
Information Office read the FMA's provisions broadly, extending its
reach beyond those American citizens who officially represent the
PLO in the United States. 235 By so doing, the Palestine Information
Office court implicates those same interests that forced the Mendel-
sohn court to narrowly construe the Anti-Terrorism Act.
If the Act is not a content-based restriction on political advo-
cacy, neither is it an O'Brien mix of speech and conduct. The only
"conduct" involved is the receipt of funds from the PLO to support
American citizens who wish to express fully their political views. As
the Supreme Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo, 2 6 "[t]he First Amend-
ment's protection against governmental abridgment of free expression
cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to
engage in public discussion. ' 237 In the case of the Palestine Informa-
tion Office, the only "conduct" involved was political advocacy on the
PLO's behalf.238 All speech, by necessity, involves an element of con-
duct. Writing involves the transference of ideas to the written page;
publishing that page involves numerous physicalacts such as purchas-
ing suitable equipment, supplies etc.; distribution of the finished prod-
uct involves even greater action. The safeguards of the first
amendment are reduced when strict scrutiny applies to only rarefied
or extraordinary cases.239
233. 123 CONG. REC. 19,499 (1977) (daily ed. June 16, 1977).
234. Mendlesohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1479-86.
235. Adherence to a "control" test, without proof of official affiliation to the group or
individual said to be "in control," has disturbing implications for all United States citizens
who associate in some limited sense with unpopular or disfavored organizations. See supra
note 160.
236. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
237. Id. at 49.
238. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Congress
expressly indicated its desire to stop the spread of the PLO's "ideology of hate and violence."
See 133 CONG. REC. E2249 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Gallegly). But the
government may not restrict expression simply by asserting the undesirability of permitting
particular ideas to enter the realm of discussion or awareness. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (invalidating
statute, which prohibited advertisements by pharmacists, in order to further state interest of
maintaining professional standards, when state goal of statute was achieved through keeping
people in ignorance).
239. Justice Black, who rejected a "balancing" approach to first amendment freedoms,
vigorously asserted:
I do not subscribe to [the "balancing" of constitutionally guaranteed rights with
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Even when employing a less demanding form of judicial review,
as stipulated in O'Brien, the Act does not satisfy this minimal balanc-
ing test.2" Congress drafted the Act far too broadly, making no dis-
tinction between American citizens who are officials of the PLO in the
United States, and those who simply wish to hear the views of the
PLO or express them to others. Furthermore, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish which views are those of the PLO, which views are those of
some of its individual members, which views are those of some who
occasionally support only several of the PLO's positions, which views
are those of Palestinians sympathetic to the PLO, which views are
countervailing state interests] for I believe that the First Amendment's
unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all
the "balancing" that was to be [done] .... [I]t certainly cannot be denied that
the very object of adopting the First Amendment, as well as the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights, was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of
the area of any congressional control that may be attempted through the exercise
of precisely those powers that are now being used to "balance" the Bill of Rights
out of existence.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). For a
further elaboration of Black's "absolute" approach to the first amendment, see H. BLACK, A
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960).
Some have argued that the controversy between Justice Black and Justice Harlan in Konigs-
berg (and other cases) over "absolutes" versus "balancing" has been overstated. See, e.g.,
Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428
(1967).
240. The factors chosen by the courts to weigh in the Anti-Terrorism Act cases
demonstrate the subjective nature of the O'Brien inquiry. In Mendelsohn, the court weighed
the governmental interest in denying the PLO the benefits of operating in the United States
against the right of the professors to receive funding for their speaking tours. Mendelsohn v.
Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Yet instead the courts could have
weighed the government's interest against any number of other competing values, including
the right to speak or associate with organizations of one's choice. The balance could then have
been struck quite differently, or struck differently using the exact same interests weighed by the
courts.
Given that the professors in Mendelsohn have sworn that they are unable, without PLO
reimbursement of their travel expenses, to attend various meetings throughout the United
States and explain the positions and views of the PLO, it is relevant to consider Justice
Harlan's concurrence in O'Brien:
I wish to make explicit my understanding that [the Court's criteria do] not
foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when
an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a regulation which
furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the
Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a "speaker"
from reaching a significant. audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully
communicate.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). Since the
effective exercise of free speech in today's world requires, at a minimum, substantial monetary
funding, the Act-when viewed in conjunction with the Palestine Information Office cases-
shields a significant audience from exposure to the political views of the PLO or those who
share its viewpoint.
ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1987
those of Jews in the region who share some of the PLO's views, and so
on. One cannot copyright a point of view. Nor should the degree of
first amendment protection afforded that point of view be made
dependent upon the funding source that enabled that point of view to
be heard. As the Supreme Court stated, in the context of affirming
corporate speech, "[t]he constitutional guarantee of free speech
'serves significant societal interests' wholly apart from the speaker's
interest in self-expression . . . . The identity of the speaker is not
decisive in determining whether speech is protected." '241 It is a pecu-
liar notion that links financial renumeration to the expression of a-
particular viewpoint, as if all can be known of a person's identity by
simply looking at his tax returns.
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regu-
lations is dubious for three reasons. First, it assumes that a content-
neutral regulation will affect with equal force different groups or dif-
ferent points of view. Second, it assumes that the goals and values
served by free expression are necessarily threatened more seriously by
governmental regulations that aim at content than those that do not.
Third, it assumes that one can always conceptually differentiate those
regulations that aim at content and those that do not.242 The Act
demonstrates the danger of accepting these three assumptions. Sym-
bolic speech, or speech that involves nonspeech elements, should not
be abridged simply by categorical placement and the assertion of
defense, national security, or other social interests.
243
A disturbing aspect of the courts' reliance on the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral regulations is that, regard-
less of the categorization, the sum total of communications is
reduced. 2" If the purpose of the first amendment is to inform deci-
sionmaking and therefore produce better voters, then content-neutral
regulations should logically be as suspect as content-based regula-
tions.245 Regardless of the government's intent when it acted against
241. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. California Pub. Util. Comm., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality)
(quoting First National Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
242. For an excellent discussion of these assumptions, see M. REDISH, supra note 224, at
87-126.
243. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 314-15 (1984)
(Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting) (categorical placement limits appropriate level of
analysis); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (freedom of expression cannot be
limited to a useless definition for purposes of abridgement).
244. M. REDISH, supra note 224, at 102.
245. The "checking" theory of the first amendment, which posits that free speech is
designed to "check" government functioning, is equally threatened by a deferential approach
to content-neutral regulations. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521. Since content-neutral regulations also deprive those who
listen of potential criticism of the government, the checking function, to a certain extent, must
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the Palestine Information Office, the end result was closure of the
Office and the forced sale of its telephones, typewriters, computers,
photocopy machines, pens, and all other communicative tools in its
246possession. The necessary consequence, despite professed alle-
giance to the principles of free speech, is a significant decrease in the
dissemination of information and a concomitant loss in the ability of
voters to judge the propriety of governmental action. Content-neutral
regulations thus deserve greater scrutiny than they have received from
the courts.24 7 Regulation of an expression for reasons other than its
content is no less an interference with expression.248
2. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In the Palestine Information Office case, as well as the cases aris-
ing under the Act, it is now clear that Americans may no longer asso-
ciate freely with the PLO.249 The right to associate is a penumbral
right, not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but vital to
securing other explicitly guaranteed rights.25° As the Supreme Court
has noted, effective advocacy of controversial views is indisputably
enhanced by group association.25' Yet it has become virtually impos-
sible to associate with the PLO without possible censure under either
the Act or the FMA. This is regardless of whether one endorses the
terrorist activities of the PLO or even if one actively works within the
PLO to end such terrorist activities. Associational freedom takes on a
be necessarily undermined. See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis,
34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); see also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 344 (1978) (arguing
that political speech cannot be deprived even incidentally).
246. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman,
J., dissenting) (listing goods and services of Office which must be discontinued and disposed of
by State Department order).
247. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1963)
(Courts must conduct searching inquiry before rights of free speech and association are
infringed.).
248. M. REDISH, supra note 224, at 104.
249. None of the courts interpreting either the FMA or the Anti-Terrorism Act identified
which contacts specifically trigger application of the statutes. Before the government may
restrict the rights of Americans who wish to associate with an allegedly criminal organization,
the government must establish a specific intent to further those illegal aims. Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972). Absent evidence of such intent, the Act's effort to limit the first
amendment right to freely associate because of terrorist activities abroad is an overly sweeping
approach that is constitutionally suspect. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
512-13 (1964); NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
250. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958) (first amendment protects political
association); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973) (freedom to associate includes
freedom to associate with political party of one's choice).
251. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465.
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special significance in times of social crisis, acting as a source of affili-
ation for some or a source of anger for others.252 Such periods typi-
cally involve a search for the root of such societal fragmentation;
scapegoats, and unpopular organizations, often provide an easy and
identifiable target.253
Freedom of association should not be conditioned on whether an
American citizen seeks association with a foreign principal or organi-
zation.254 Foreign policy cannot act as a talisman by which its simple
invocation begins and ends all constitutional analysis.255 It is particu-
larly unfortunate when the government conducts its foreign policy by
denying the American public the information it needs to assess that
policy.2 56 Associations often serve several functions, both political
and social.257 In this instance, the Act has created a guilt by associa-
tion in affiliation with the PLO.258 If freedom of association is to have
real meaning, American citizens must be free to promote peacefully
their organizations' objectives, regardless of disapproval by
lawmakers or by portions of the lawmaker's constituency. The com-
bined effect of the FMA and the Act ensures that the objectives of the
PLO are never effectively promoted by American citizens.
252. See Blasi, supra note 243, at 495-500. Blasi argues for the adoption of extremely
protective, absolute judicial standards for safeguarding freedom of association in times of
social crisis. Id. at 498.
253. Id. at 495.
254. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). An indispensable aspect of a
citizen's right of free speech should be the choice of those on whose behalf one will speak. The
decision to speak on behalf of another is necessarily a manifestation of the speaker's own
expressive and associational rights. Brief of Amici Curiae at 21, Palestine Information Office
v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398). See generally J. SKOLNICK, THE
POLITICS OF PROTEST (1969) (discussing relationship between political association and
participation).
255. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
256. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 38, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d
932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398); cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
717 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring).
257. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends").
258. In Palestine Information Office, the D.C. Circuit wrote that the Supreme Court has
upheld limitations on free association conducted for an illegitimate purpose. Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See, e.g., Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973) (Private discrimination, although characterized as a form
of freedom of association, has never been granted constitutional protection.). The Supreme
Court, however, has regularly held that the individual must have a specific knowledge and
intent to further those illegal aims. See, e.g., Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203, 228-30
(1961). No intent to engage in criminal activity was ever asserted against any of the citizens
prosecuted under the Act.
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C. The Anti-Terrorism Act as a Bill of Attainder
The Mendelsohn court conceded that the Act is, in form, a "clas-
sic Bill of Attainder."259 The generally recognized elements of a Bill
of Attainder are as follows: 1) nonjudicial punishments; 2) lack of a
judicial trial; and 3) specific identification of the group or individual
affected.2" The Mendelsohn court refused to strike down the Act,
despite its agreement that, in ordinary circumstances, the Act would
satisfy the elements of a Bill of Attainder. The principal reason given
was that the court had already found the PLO to be outside the con-
stitutional structure and hence not entitled to the protection of the
laws of the United States.26' The court explained that the Act is an
exercise of the foreign affairs powers of the Congress directed to the
PLO as a foreign entity, and "Congress may force an American citi-
zen to choose between the full panoply of protections offered by the
Constitution and voluntarily taking on an official role in the opera-
tions of a foreign power." '262 The authority cited by the court in sup-
263 hvport of this proposition, however, is unpersuasive. None have
taken so broad a step as to prevent the Constitution from protecting
an American citizen merely because he or she has chosen to associate
in an official capacity with a foreign principal. If the Act is a "classic
Bill of Attainder," should not the Constitution protect the American
citizens who fall under the provisions of the Act? The precedent set
here could have wide implications. Thousands of American citizens
engage in political advocacy on behalf of foreign principals, and hun-
dreds of thousands belong to political associations not necessarily
based in the United States.21 To say that American citizens are pro-
259. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1488 (1988).
260. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). An integral component of a Bill
of Attainder is that the legislature declares a specific group guilty without a judicial trial and
its attendant procedural safeguards. Id. In the case of the Act, Americans who support the
PLO's political positions are prejudged without an actual determination of each individual's
support of terrorism.
261. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1489.
262. Id. at 1490.
263. The court cites article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits United States
citizens from accepting titles from foreign governments without congressional consent, and
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980) ("statutorily defined voluntary act of expatriation,
accompanied by intent to relinquish citizenship sufficient to terminate citizenship"). American
citizens, however, need not go so far as to accept a foreign crown nor express an intent to
relinquish citizenship simply by virtue of associating with a foreign principal. That a court
would base the loss of constitutional rights on precedent as marginal as this is alarming.
264. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 627 (K. Koek
23d ed. 1989). See generally K. BOYLE, supra note 1. Boyle details the sometimes subtle and
sometimes blatant practices in over fifty countries of controlling the circulation of information
and ideas. By limiting political association to domestic organizations, the United States
effectively restricts participation in the global exchange of information.
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tected by the Constitution until such time as they seek to associate
with unpopular foreign organizations is to create only formal protec-
tions that disappear with effective exercise. By merely fixing the pri-
mary focus of a Bill of Attainder to groups located outside of the
United States, American citizens who belong to those groups become
subject to congressionally imposed penalties without the benefits of
judicial intervention.265 Thus, Amnesty International,266 The Com-
mittee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES),267 and
even the Catholic Church 268 become appropriate targets for legisla-
tively imposed disabilities. The erosion of the Constitution in this
manner should be of concern to all Americans, and the myopic con-
centration on the particular group involved in these cases should not
blind the courts to the overreaching principle involved.
In Cummings v. Missouri,2 69 the Supreme Court indicated that
Bills of Attainder are most likely to arise "in times of rebellion, or...
of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most
liable ... to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and
liberties of others. ' ' 27° This has undoubtedly been the case. As the
Mendelsohn court noted, the laws struck down as violating the Bill of
265. Restrictive actions by public officials, in times of crisis, usually have widespread public
support and therefore cannot be redressed simply through the jury system. See A. Hiss, IN
THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 286 (1957). It is the courts, as a counter-majoritarian
institution, that must guard against mob rule and tyranny of the majority. Unfortunately,
during the two great threats to free speech in the twentieth century-the "Red Scare"
following World War I and the period of virulent anti-Communism personified by Senator
Joseph McCarthy-the courts failed to uphold basic first amendment values. Judicial
constructions during these periods of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Smith Act,
respectively, produce prudent skepticism that the judiciary can withstand future times of
national hysteria. See Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1352 (doubting efficacy of first amendment tests during future outbreaks of
widespread hostility to dissenters). Future acts of terrorism, conducted within the United
States, can produce the turbulence neccesary for highly restrictive judicial interpretations of
the Anti-Terrorism Act.
266. Amnesty International, which monitors human rights violations and works to free
prisoners of conscience, is a world-wide organization based in London. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASSOCIATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 627 (23d ed. K. Koek, ed. 1989).
267. This is not as unusual as it might initially appear, given the FBI's recent revelations of
its investigation of domestic groups such as CISPES who are opposed to the Reagan
administration's Latin American policies. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
268. It was not too long ago that people questioned whether John F. Kennedy's catholic
beliefs precluded him from occupying the White House. See A. MENENDEZ, JOHN F.
KENNEDY: CATHOLIC AND HUMANIST 31-44 (1987). Religious opposition to Kennedy often
focused upon his alleged "control" and "domination" by the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at
33. For a historical analysis of early anti-Catholic persecution in the United States, see A.
TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT 365-95 (1944).
269. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
270. Id. at 323 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1344, at 217
(5th ed. 1891)).
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Attainder clause all arose "either at times of national crisis or when
the attention of Congress was drawn by public clamor to problems of
widespread interest. ' 27 ' The fear of world-wide terrorism has caused
great public unrest and fosters the social climate within which Bills of
Attainder are most likely to thrive.27 2 Future acts of terrorism within
the United States can be the catalyst for judicial interpretations of the
Anti-Terrorism Act far more expansive than the narrow application
rendered by the Mendelsohn court.
V. CONCLUSION
The potential cost of the Anti-Terrorism Act should be weighed
against its relative benefits. Yet little benefit has been shown as a
result of the Act's passage. It is unlikely that the Act would have
applied to the Palestine Information Office given the restrictive read-
ing of it by the Mendelsohn court.2 73 In addition, the Act was held
inapplicable to the PLO observer mission at the United Nations in
New York, due to the preeminence of the existing Headquarters
Agreement.27 4 The professors who wish to travel and speak at col-
leges and public forums about the Middle East, and who wish to be
reimbursed for their travel expenses by the PLO, must now seek fund-
ing elsewhere. While the Congressmen who passed the Act spoke of
fighting terrorism,275 the district court recognized the legitimate inter-
est of the United States in passing the Act as preventing the PLO
271. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1487.
272. See Clarizio, Will Anti-Terrorism become the McCarthyism of the 1980s?, A.B.A.
JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 1986, at 38. Clarizio notes that the desire to punish terrorists should not
supersede our respect for the law. Id. at 40. As former American Bar Association President
William Falsgraf has argued, the United States cannot alter its system of law and the
fundamental precepts that underlie it in order to fight terrorism, for "[i]f we do, the terrorists
have won." Id.
The Supreme Court has long understood the need to safeguard rights guaranteed by the
Constitution during periods of crisis or war, even if it has failed at times to act upon on this
understanding. As far back as 1866, the Court recognized:
[I]f society is disturbed by civil commotion-if the passions of men are aroused
and the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded-these safeguards need,
and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted with the guardianship of
the Constitution and laws. In no other way can we transmit to posterity
unimpaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the
Revolution.
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124 (1866).
273. See supra notes 127-83 and accompanying text.
274. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468-70.
275. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S13,854 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) ("there is a real fear that these offices in Washington and New York might be
used as bases for terror"); 133 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. April 29, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Kemp) ("terrorist bases").
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from receiving the benefits of operating in the United States.276 The
PLO, however, continued to maintain its United Nations mission
undisturbed by the Act, and the affiliated Washington office was
closed under another statute entirely.277 Thus the main political goal
of the Act, fighting terrorism, has been eviscerated by the court while
little has actually changed in the way PLO operations are conducted
in the United States.
What has changed, as the New York Times wrote in an editorial
condemning the Act, is the "right of the American people to hear a
public debate enriched by the views of even the most quarrelsome
sources." 278 United States citizens who attempt to associate or estab-
lish an office with other Americans that support the political message
of the PLO now risk persecution under the Act or closure under the
FMA. There is little, in fact, that limits the State Department from
designating a person as an "entity" for purposes of the FMA and
ordering his personal office or facilities to cease operation.279
Silencing opposition views hurts all of us. Americans may no
longer fully hear and judge for themselves the views of the PLO. This
is debilitating to a democracy that prides itself and premises its legiti-
macy upon the ability of all Americans to vigorously engage in polit-
ical expression. If our democracy is to flourish it must have criticism
and dissent, for without criticism our government grows static, and
without dissent its abuses go unrecognized. A government willing to
limit the expression of views on an issue of public importance to those
views that the government supports, unfortunately, displays an inse-
curity over the correctness of the government's own views.280 This
creates the unwarranted suspicion that views disfavored by the gov-
ernment have more merit to them than they may actually contain. In
the end, a propaganda victory is needlessly achieved by the PLO,28 I
while the laws' only discernible effect is to threaten the Constitution
and the values supposedly protected by it.
276. Mendlesohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1484.
277. Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'g 674 F.
Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1987) (FMA).
278. See N.Y. Times, supra note 21.
279. Brief of Amici Curiae at 20-21, Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5398).
280. As Henry Steele Commager noted, in the context of condemning fixed tests of
government loyalty: "The effort is itself a confession of fear, a declaration of insolvency. Those
who are sure of themselves do not need reassurance, and those who have confidence in the
strength and the virtue of America do not need to fear either criticism or competition."
Commager, Who Is Loyal to America?, HARPERS, Sept. 1947, at 196.
281. See, e.g., Greenberger, Bill Requiring Closure of PLO's Washington, UN. Offices May
Be Propaganda Blow to US., Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
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Democratic theory is premised on the independent and open dis-
cussion of all ideas, regardless of their repugnancy or dislike to some
portions of the population. Deprived of the opportunity to judge for
themselves the merits in all points of view, American citizens cannot
challenge fundamental assumptions that may be mistaken. They may
not question widely believed half-truths and may fail to seek new
solutions to previously unsolvable dilemmas. These solutions are then
found elsewhere, where one may vigorously explore, accept, or reject
working solutions free from disapprobation or sanction.282 In medie-
val Italy, for example, religious authorities forbade Galileo from
spreading his theory that the sun and not the earth was the center of
the solar system. 283 Scientific progress then shifted to other coun-
tries.2"4 Furthermore, it is no coincidence that increased stress and
anxiety resulting from war or the threat of war is often related to the
subjugation of unpopular domestic groups.285 As a government
282. See R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2. As John Stuart Mill reasoned:
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can
certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be in error, it may, and very commonly
does, contain a portion of the truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion
on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being
supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless
it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by
,most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but fourthly,
the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct ....
J.S. MILL, supra note 230, at 68-69.
283. S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY oF.TIME 179 (1988).
284. See S. ARONOWITZ, SCIENCE AS POWER: DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY IN MODERN
SOCIETY (1988) (challenging claim of science to be independent of the influence of social or
historical conditions); see also R. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at ix; T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Kuhn argues that changes in science are accompanied
by severe persecution of those who challenge the accepted paradigm.
285. A regrettable example is the Alien and Sedition crisis of 1798, in which the Federalist
administration used the threat of war with France to repress opposition Republicans. In a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, written at the height of the constitutional crisis, James Madison
wrote: "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to the
provisions against dangers, real or pretended, from abroad." J. MADISON, COLLECTED
LETTERS OF JAMES MADISON (1894), reprinted in H.H. RANSON, CAN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY SURVIVE THE COLD WAR xviii (1963). Professor Leonard Levy persuasively
argues that the Jeffersonians, once in power, were not considerably more broad-minded to
their political critics than the Federalists had been. See L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963). For an illuminating discussion of how the path to war
is often accompanied by jingoistic rhetoric, repressive assaults on the right of dissent, and a
public atmosphere of intolerance, see 1 T. EMERSON & D. HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 254-338 (2d ed. 1958).
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moves closer to totalitarianism, the percentage of social activities
defined as violating basic political laws will increase.28 6 With presci-
ence, Francis Biddle warned Americans in 1951 about their rising
intolerance towards suspected Communists:
We should not be deceived by the repeated and usually perfervid
salutes to the theory of free speech. They continue undiminished.
But the test of reality is found in practice. There lies the new direc-
tion. That practice should so strikingly differ 'from preaching is
one of those queer contradictions that foreigners find so difficult to
understand, perhaps commoner in this land of ideals than in emo-
tionally tougher and older countries. The constant asseverations of
our devotion to freedom of speech, often set forth in preambles to
the imposition of control procedures, suggest an uneasy awareness
that something of our old faith has slipped. We are ashamed, and
consequently a little louder in reciting a creed we hesitate to
enforce.28 7
The Anti-Terrorism Act reflects Congress' inability to deal effec-
tively with international terrorism, and the resulting restrictions on
the domestic rights of American citizens cannot be accepted by a free
society. To recognize that international terrorism is a real and dan-
gerous threat should not mean we must also accept, without argu-
ment or reasoning,' incantations of the voice of fear, anxiety, or
political opportunism. If democracy is to be preserved, ideas and the
freedoms that encourage them must be protected from the reach or
control of central authority.
LANCE A. HARKE
286. R. ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSus 29 (1972). Rose notes that relatively
innocuous activites, such as abstract painting or flag waving, can become the subject of
governmental restraints when a political regime perceives itself as threatened. Id. For a
Supreme Court decision striking down such a restraint, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369-70 (1931) (holding that state prohibition on display of red flag as symbol of
opposition to organized government curtailed free political discussion).
287. F. BIDDLE, supra note 1, at 7.
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